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I – Introduction 
 
Preserved in what have come to be called the ‘uncertain books’ (libri incerti) 
of Oribasius’ Medical Collections are four texts on regimen (δίαιτα) attributed to 
the Pneumatist physician, Athenaeus of Attalia. In these texts, Athenaeus 
distinguishes two types of exercise or training (γυμνάσια) that are required at 
each stage of life: training of the body and training of the soul.0F1 He says that 
training of the body includes activities like physical exercises, eating, drinking, 
bathing and sleep.1F2 Training of the soul, on the other hand, consists of thinking, 
education, and emotional regulation—what one might otherwise call 
‘philosophy.’ While some notion of ‘training of the soul’2F3 and the related contrast 
between ‘bodily’ and ‘psychic’ exercise is common in the Socratic tradition from 
Plato to the Stoics,3F4 Athenaeus is nevertheless the earliest extant medical author 
to distinguish these kinds of training and to treat them as equally important 
aspects of regimen.4F5 My aim in this paper is to propose some reasons why he 
 
1 I refer to these texts throughout by their titles in Oribasius, Collectiones medicae, libri incerti 
(= Orib. Coll. med. (lib. inc.)): ‘On Habituation’ = Coll. med. (lib. inc.) 17.1-7 (106,8-29 Raeder); 
‘Regimen for Women’ = Coll. med. (lib. inc.) 21.1-8 (112,13-112,33 Raeder); ‘Preparation for 
Having Children’ = Coll. med. (lib. inc.) 23.1-5 (115,33-116,20 Raeder); ‘On Healthy Regimen’ 
= Coll. med. (lib. inc.) 39.1-21 (138,18-141,9 Raeder). The libri incerti of Oribasius’ Collectiones 
medicae are likely a later compilation and survive in only one manuscript. See Bussemaker, U. 
and Daremberg, C. (1858). Oeuvres d’Oribase, vol. 3, I-III and Raeder, J. (1933). Oribasii 
Collectionum Medicarum Reliquae, vol. 4, VI. 
2 First systematized by Diocles of Carystus. See Diocles, F182 vdE and the comments ad loc. 
in van der Eijk, P. (2001). Diocles, vol. 2, 347-52, esp. 347 on the relationship between Diocles 
and Athenaeus. 
3 The metaphor is at least as early as Isocrates, Ad Nicoclem, 51.1. 
4 Jaeger, W. (1957). Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, vol. 2, tr. Highet, G., 230-32; 
Bartoš, H. (2015). Philosophy and Dietetics in the Hippocratic On Regimen: A Delicate Balance 
of Health, 12-14. 
5 See n.61 below for a qualification. A soul/body distinction is mentioned in a discussion on 
phrenitis in Celsus, De medicina 3.18.6-16 (123,13-125,26 Marx), although no psychological 
advice is given. On Celsus and Athenaeus, see Wellmann, M. (1895). Die Pneumatische Schule 
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found this distinction useful and to examine how he justified incorporating it into 
his writings on regimen. 
Athenaeus almost certainly adopted the distinction from Plato’s discussion of 
regimen in the Timaeus,5F6 a work Athenaeus knew.6F7 In the Timaeus, Plato claims 
that well-being (σωτηρία) requires that we “do not exercise the soul without the 
body, nor the body without the soul, so that they might both be kept in balance 
and health”7F8—only then can we “become whole [ὁλόκληρος] and altogether 
healthy.”8F9 Athenaeus agrees that regimen requires a balance of both 
psychological and bodily activities, and in an echo of the Timaeus he writes that 
“one must not overlook any lack of training [ἀγύμναστον] of either the soul or 
body, so that we may come into old age whole [ὁλόκληροί] and make use of 
wholeness in all things.”9F10 
Yet, Athenaeus also departs from Plato’s advice in the Timaeus. For Plato, the 
aim of psychological and physical training is ultimately “the constant care of 
what is divine in us,” our rational and immortal soul.10F11 Athenaeus’ interests, 
however, are more mundane. Although he believes that our psychological states 
can be either beneficial or harmful,11F12 what he says they are beneficial for is 
almost invariably the body. So, he says that children should be accustomed to an 
easiness of soul, because “relaxation and joy of the soul contribute a great deal 
to the body’s thriving.”12F13 Likewise with intellectual study: children must avoid 
excessive lessons because it is likely to lead to the corruption of their bodies.13F14 
In fact, his recommendations almost always follow a pattern in which some form 
of psychological training is recommended, and then justified by stating how it 
benefits the body, rather than the soul. 
Even what seem to be claims about the importance of psychological training 
for the development of moral virtue take on a physiological character. For 
 
bis auf Archigenes (= DPnS), 8; Kudlien, F. (1962), ‘Poseidonios und die Ärzteschule der 
Pneumatiker’, Hermes 90.4, 420 n. 3. 
6 The close correspondences between Plato and Athenaeus were first noticed by Kulf, E. 
(1970). ‘Untersuchungen zu Athenaios von Attaleia: Ein Beitrag zur antiken Diätetik’. See also 
Wöhrle (1990). Studien zur Theorie der αntiken Gesundheitslehre, 211-12. 
7 Gal. Trem. Palp. 6 (VII.609-10 K.), reports that Athenaeus plagiarised from Timaeus. For 
the text, see n. 64 below. 
8 Plato, Timaeus 88b5-c1: μία δὴ σωτηρία πρὸς ἄμφω, μήτε τὴν ψυχὴν ἄνευ σώματος κινεῖν 
μήτε σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς, ἵνα ἀμυνομένω γίγνησθον ἰσορρόπω καὶ ὑγιῆ. 
9 Pl. Ti. 44b8-c1: “Hence, if there is the right kind of nurture supporting an education, one 
will become whole and altogether healthy [ἂν μὲν οὖν δὴ καὶ συνεπιλαμβάνηταί τις ὀρθὴ τροφὴ 
παιδεύσεως, ὁλόκληρος ὑγιής τε παντελῶς … γίγνεται]”. 
10 ‘On Healthy Regimen’, Orib. Coll. med. (lib. inc.) 39.10 (139,37-140,1 Raeder): καθόλου 
δ’ οὐδὲν παραθεωρητέον οὔτε τῆς ψυχῆς οὔτε τοῦ σώματος ἀγύμναστον, ἀλλὰ πάντων ὁμοίως 
ἐπιμελητέον, ὅπως καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας ὁλόκληροί τε ἀφικώμεθα καὶ πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς ὁλοκλήροις 
χρησώμεθα. 
11 Pl. Tim. 90c4-5: ἀεὶ θεραπεύοντα τὸ θεῖον […] ἑαυτῷ. 
12 ‘On Habituation’, Orib. Coll. med. (lib. inc.) 17.1-2 (106,9-14 Raeder). 
13 ‘On Healthy Regimen’, Orib. Coll. med. (lib. inc.) 39.3 (138,32-33 Raeder). 
14 Ibid., 39.4 (139,4-6 Raeder). 
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instance, he says that youth must work hard in both body and soul since the strong 
desire for sex at this age is able to destroy the development of soul and body.14F15 
Yet, when he comes to discuss sexual habits in ‘Preparation for Having 
Children,’ the reasons he gives for controlling sexual desire again focus on its 
bodily effects: control aids fertility, prevents congenital disease, and saves a 
woman’s body from becoming malnourished. 15F16 In each of these cases, 
Athenaeus’ strategy for incorporating psychological regimen into his advice is to 
show how it benefits the well-being of the body, while remaining silent about its 
effect on the soul itself. 
Athenaeus not only restricts the aims of psychological training to the body. 
He also attributes this view to Hippocrates. Another strategy Athenaeus uses to 
incorporate psychological training into hygiene involves finding parallels in 
Hippocratic writings which, if interpreted correctly, can be presented as 
anticipating a view like the one found in the Timaeus. For Athenaeus, it is 
Hippocrates, not Plato, who is the source of advice concerning hygiene. The 
project of attributing to Hippocrates something like the views found in the 
physiological and medical sections of the Timaeus is one of Athenaeus’ legacies 
to the medical tradition.16F17 
Athenaeus’ views, however, only come down to us in fragments, and to 
provide a reconstruction of his views on regimen from the fragments alone would 
be incomplete and largely speculative. My aim, therefore, is to try to provide 
evidence for the narrative I have just sketched by comparing Athenaeus’ 
references to Hippocrates with their counterparts in Galen’s Hippocratic 
commentaries (section III). I will try to show that in these texts, we can find 
evidence of responses to something like Athenaeus’ strategy of harmonizing 
Plato and Hippocrates. More precisely, what we find in Galen’s commentaries 
are reports of a dispute concerning the distinction between philosophy and 
medicine precisely at the boundaries Athenaeus is attempting to blur. 
Traces of this dispute, however, are found in texts other than Galen, and they 
raise fundamental questions about how medical writers at the time of the early 
Roman Empire understood the doctor’s role in a patient’s mental life. At this time 
they often classified and treated a range of mental diseases whose causes were 
claimed to be physiological, but which manifested psychological symptoms. 
Many of Athenaeus’ near contemporaries also recognized that the state of a 
patient’s soul could have a detrimental or positive effect on the body.17F18 It was 
 
15 Ibid., 39.8 (139,30-36 Raeder). 
16 ‘Preparation for Having Children’, Orib. Coll. med. (lib. inc.) 23.2-5 (116,8-20 Raeder). 
The text is quoted in section III below, 000. 
17 This is itself an anticipation of the strategy we find in Galen, discussed in De Lacy, P. 
(1972). ‘Galen’s Platonism’, The American Journal of Philology 93.1: 36–39.  
18 See: (i) the Herophileans ap. Soranus, Gynaecia (= Sor. Gyn.) 4.2.1-4 (131,8-132,4 Ilberg); 
(ii) Asclepiades ap. Plutarch, De tranquillitate animi 17 (Moralia 476a4-6); (iii) Aretaeus, De 
causis et signis diuturnorum morborum (= Aret. SD) 1.7.8 (= 3.7.8, 46,9-13 Hude); (iv) Sor. Gyn. 
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also common for medical writers to recommend ‘psychological’ means of 
calming-down or otherwise distracting a patient who is distressed. 18F19 Some of 
Athenaeus’ medical contemporaries, however, were ambivalent, even hostile, to 
the core thesis implied in the fragments of Athenaeus on regimen: that doctors 
should cultivate in their patients dispositions to health-promoting ways of feeling 
and thinking.  Soranus of Ephesus, one of the clearest voices against such 
educational advice from doctors, writes that advice about education belongs “to 
the realm of philosophy [φιλοσοφωτέραν τὴν διάταξιν]” and leaves it to other 
physicians to “break with custom and philosophize [παρὰ τρόπον ἄλλοις 
ἐπιτρέψαντες φιλοσοφεῖν].” 19F20 For both Soranus and Athenaeus, the question was 
not whether a patient’s psychological dispositions and virtues were worth 
cultivating, but whether it was up to the doctor to do so. Athenaeus believed it 
was, and I will provide (in section IV) some plausible motivations he may have 
had for integrating traditionally philosophical topics—intellectual study 
(μαθήματα), habituation (συνήθεια), and education (παιδεία)—into medicine. 
These discussions, however, presuppose an answer to the question of how 
Athenaeus understood body and soul, and how one might be a cause of health or 
disease to the other. There are no extant fragments of Athenaeus which discuss 
this question explicitly. We can, however, look to fragments concerning his 
views on mental disease to help fill in the gaps. Accordingly, I will begin (in 
section II) by looking to those fragments where Athenaeus correlates 
psychological disease with different bodily states. 
 
 
II – Athenaeus on Mental Disease 
Athenaeus is said to have come from Attalia in Pamphylia, a city in Asia Minor 
on the Black Sea coast, and likely flourished towards the end of the first century 
BCE.20F21 He is most well-known as the founder of the Pneumatic school of 
 
1.39.1-5 (27,28-28,5 Ilberg), 1.53.1-3 (38,21-39,5 Ilberg), 1.54.1-3 (39,7-17 Ilberg); (v) a quasi-
medical example in Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales 5.7 (= Plut. Quaes. Conv., Mor. 681d-e).  
19 See: (i) Celsus, Med. 3.18.11 (124,17-22 Marx) on the use of threats, music, and recitation 
of familiar literature; (ii) Aretaeus, De curatione acutorum morborum (= Aret. CA) 2.2.2 on 
calming a patient after spitting up blood (= 6.2.2, 121,1-7 Hude); Aret. CA 2.11.6 on the use of 
wine to calm the soul (= 6.11.6, 143,6-8 Hude); (iv) Sor. Gyn. 1.47.3.5-6 on calming the soul of 
pregnant women to prevent miscarriage (34,30-33 Ilberg), 1.53.1.1-4 on using arguments or 
speech (διὰ λόγων) to calm pregnant mothers’ desires for foods that might harm a baby (38,21-
23 Ilberg), 1.54.2.1-5 on diverting the attention of the mother in pregnancy (39,10-14 Ilberg). See 
also Gill, this volume, 000. 
20 Sor. Gyn. 2.57.2-3 (93,9-14 Ilberg). See below, 000. 
21 Ps.-Galen, Introductio seu medicus (= [Gal.] Int.) 4 (XIV.683-684 K. = 9,8-15 Petit). 
Athenaeus’ dates are a matter of controversy. The only explicit evidence comes from Galen, De 
causis contentivis (= Gal. CC) 2.1 (54,3-6 Lyons (Arabic); 134,5-6 Kalbfleisch (Latin)), which 
states Athenaeus was a follower (conversatus) of the Stoic Posidonius. See Wellmann, DPnS, 8-
9; Kudlien, ‘Pneumatiker’, 419-29; s.v. ‘Pneumatiker’, RE Suppl. XI 1097-1108. Orly Lewis and 
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medicine, which seems to have had some fame in Rome during the first and 
second centuries CE.21F22 Galen tells us he was a student of the Stoic philosopher 
Posidonius, and from the fragments of his writings which remain, we know he 
engaged with the work of many other doctors and philosophers: Hippocrates, 
Plato, Aristotle, Heraclides of Pontus, Theophrastus, and Asclepiades. 22F23 Galen 
also praises the scope of his work. “Nearly none of the more recent physicians,” 
he says, “has treated as fully as Athenaeus the whole theory of the medical art.”23F24 
The extant fragments span some of this range, including views on the elements, 
on causation, on embryology, on nutrition and regimen, and on mental disease. 
Only three reports concerning Athenaeus’ views on mental disease are extant: 
one from Caelius Aurelianus on the characterization of lethargy; and two from 
Galen, one on melancholia and one on phrenitis. All three reports suggest 
Athenaeus held mental disease to be caused by a bad mixture or dyskrasia of the 
elementary qualities of the body. I will go through each in turn. 
The first fragment comes from Caelius Aurelianus, who places Athenaeus 
within a dispute about the kind of affection the mind suffers in lethargy 
(lethargo). The dispute concerned whether lethargic patients show signs of furor 
mentis (‘madness’) or alienatio mentis (‘mental derangement’).24F25 Caelius 
reports: 
Athenaeus of Tarsus25F26 said [lethargy] is a madness of the mind with 
sadness, since Asclepiades said in the first book of Acute Diseases among 
frenitics, delirium with restlessness is produced, among lethargics, with 
 
I revisit this issue in a forthcoming paper on the concept of pneuma in the Pneumatist school. It 
will be discussed more fully in my Athenaeus of Attalia: Complete Fragments with Translation 
and Commentary. 
22 Gal. CC 2.1 (54,3-4 Lyons). On the sources and doctrines of this school, Wellmann, DPnS 
is still the most thorough study. See also Nutton, V. (2012). Ancient Medicine. London: 
Routledge, 202-6. 
23 On Posidonius, see Gal. CC 2.1, reference in note above. On Plato, see Galen, De tremore, 
palpitatione, convulsione, et rigore (= Gal. Trem. Palp.) 6 (VII.609-10 K.). On Aristotle and 
Theophrastus, see Galen, De temperamentis (= Gal. Temp.) 1.3 (I.522-23 K. = 8,28-10,3 
Helmreich). On Asclepiades, Heraclides, and Strato, see Gal. Trem. Palp. 6 (VII.615-16 K.); 
Galen, De symptomatum causis (= Gal. Caus. Symp.) 2.3 (VII.165-66 K.). 
24 Galen, De elementis ex Hippocratis sententia (= Gal. Hipp. Elem.) 6.2 (I.457,14-15 K. = 
102,7-9 De Lacy): σχεδὸν οὐδεὶς τῶν νεωτέρων ἰατρῶν οὕτως ἅπαντα τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν 
τέχνην ἐξειργάσατο λόγον ὡς ὁ Ἀθήναιος. 
25 The discussion occurs in a larger dispute, moderated by Caelius, concerning whether 
lethargy is a kind of delirium (deliratio) with fever, or stupor (pressura, a state of lowered 
consciousness). See Caelius Aurelianus, Celeres uel acutae passiones (= Cael. Aurel. Acut.) 
2.1.4-8 (CML VI 1, 130,4-134,27 Bendz). On earlier instances of disputes about lethargy, see 
Jouanna, J. ‘The Typology and Aetiology of Madness in Ancient Greek Medical and 
Philosophical Writing’, in Harris, W. (2013). Mental Disorders in the Classical World, 97-118. 
26 Tarsus and Attalia were both major cities in Roman provinces of Cilicia and Pamphylia. 
Their proximity may be a source of this confusion. Wellmann claims it is likely ‘Athenaeus 
Tharsensis’ is a mistake by Caelius, but also entertains the idea that Athenaeus may have worked 
for a time in Tarsus. See Wellmann, DPnS, 9 n.8. 
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sleep and grief. Others have said lethargy is delirium with sadness and 
continual sleep, because the mind [of lethargics] does not extend into 
madness as Athenaeus says, but as Asclepiades [says] is merely fixed in 
delirium. 26F27 
One difficulty for understanding this dispute involves the distinction between 
furor (‘madness’) and alienatio (‘delirium’). 27F28 Caelius uses these terms in 
different senses depending on the context. Sometimes, he presents madness as a 
species of delirium; other times he presents delirium as a species of madness. He 
attributes the former view, that madness is a species of delirium, to Asclepiades, 
who defined ‘delirium’ as any condition in which the physical channels 
responsible for sensation are overwhelmed. Asclepiades calls this condition 
‘madness’ when the delirium is chronic and without fever, and he calls it 
phrenitis when it is acute and with fever.28F29 Caelius attributes the latter view, that 
delirium is a species of madness, to the Stoics. He says that Stoics considered 
one kind of madness to be a delirium of the mind (alienatio mentis) accompanied 
with a bodily co-affection, and that they distinguished this kind of madness from 
folly (insipientia), which they considered to be a moral condition whose 
description makes no reference to the body, but merely describes all morally 
vicious people (omnem imprudentem).29F30 
These two, different ways of characterizing madness imply that Asclepiades 
and the Stoics are classifying mental disease by different criteria. For 
Asclepiades, delirium and madness always involve some underlying bodily 
condition. The question is whether the delirium is acute and with fever (phrenitis) 
or chronic and without (madness). For the Stoics, on the other hand, the question 
was whether the affection belonged to the soul alone (folly), or whether it also 
extended to the body (delirium). 
 
27 Cael. Aurel. Acut. 2.1.6 (134,1-6 Bendz): Athenaeus Tharsensis furorem inquit mentis cum 
maestitudine, siquidem Asclepiades in primo libro Celerum passionum dixerit phreniticis 
alienationem cum turbore effici, in lethargis cum somno atque tristitia. alii alienationem cum 
maestitudine et iugi somno esse lethargiam dixerunt, etenim non habent mentem in furorem 
extentam, ut Athenaeus ait, sed sola in alienatione constitutam, ut Asclepiades. 
28 See Ahonen, M. (2014). Mental Disorders in Ancient Philosophy, 14 and 33-34; see also 
Urso, this volume, 000. Furor might translate the Greek μανία; while alienatio mentis, a common 
phrase in Latin, might translate either ἔκστασις διανοίας or simply ἔκστασις. ἔκστασις διανοίας 
is absent in Hippocratic texts, but it is found in the definitions of phrenitis and of μανία in the 
pseudo-Galenic Definitiones medicae (= [Gal.] Def. Med.), a text roughly contemporary with 
Athenaeus. For φρένιτις, see [Gal.] Def. Med. 234 (XIX.412 K.); for μανία, 246 (ΧΙΧ.416 Κ.). 
The meaning of these terms, however, is precisely what is at issue, especially in medical contexts 
where the definitions were often disputed: even if we could match Greek and Latin terms, that 
does not guarantee their univocity, which is especially a problem given the variety of ways 
Caelius says they were used. 
29 Cael. Aurel. Acut. 1.pr.15 (30,2-6 Bendz); cf. Tardae uel chronicae passiones (= Cael. 
Aurel. Chron.) 1.5.146 (516,19-23 Bendz). 
30 Cael. Aurel. Chron. 1.5.144 (516,5-7 Bendz). On the Stoic distinction, see Ahonen, Mental 
Disorders, 103-112; and Ahonen, this volume, 000. 
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Either sense of madness, the Asclepiadean or Stoic, might be attributed to 
Athenaeus. Caelius says that other physicians’ definitions of lethargy differed 
from that of Athenaeus “because the mind [of lethargics] does not extend into 
madness [non habent mentem in furorem extentam] as Athenaeus says, but as 
Asclepiades is merely fixed in delirium [sola in alienatione constitutam].”30F31 At 
a first glance, this might suggest that Athenaeus was following Asclepiades’ 
classification of acute and chronic forms of delirium. On this view, both 
physicians would be in agreement regarding the nature of the terms, and the 
dispute would be about the duration of the illness. By calling lethargy a kind of 
madness, Athenaeus would be saying lethargy is a chronic condition of mental 
disturbance accompanied by maestitudine.31F32 Since, however, lethargy was 
almost universally considered to be an acute disease, other physicians might have 
disagreed with Athenaeus’ characterization of the condition.32F33 
The lack of evidence, however, suggests caution. Caelius is not explicit that 
the distinction between acute and chronic forms of illness was at issue. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that Caelius is reporting Athenaeus’ full description 
of lethargy; he seems only to be picking out that aspect which he took over from 
Asclepiades and which was inconsistent with the view he endorses.33F34 Without an 
 
31 For the text, see n. 27 above. Caelius does not tell us who these other doctors were. 
32 It seems maestitudo and tristitia are being used in the same sense, but Caelius is not explicit. 
In a later part of this passage, he discusses a definition of lethargy from Leonides the Episynthetic. 
Wellmann, DPnS, 16-17 associates Leonides with the Pneumatist school, and Caelius reports that 
Leonides took the terms to mean the same thing: ‘maestitudinem uel tristitiam’ at Cael. Aurel. 
Chron. 2.1.8 (134,18-19 Bendz). As Caelius presents it, Leonides’ definition of lethargy 
resembles the one he attributes to Athenaeus, but with more physiological details: “an obtrusion 
along the passages of the meninges, with madness of mind, also fever and sadness, and distress 
and a large pulse [obtrusio secundum uias membranarum cum furore mentis atque febre et 
maestitudine ac pressura et pulsu magno]” (Cael. Aurel. Acut. 2.1.7-8, 134,14-16 Bendz). 
Caelius criticizes Leonides for including the cause of the disease—the affection of the meninges 
(obtrusio secundum vias membranarum,)—since the cause was disputed and hence unclear 
(occulta). Caelius also criticizes Leonides for including “sadness or grief [maestitudine or 
tristitia]” and “madness of the mind [furorem mentis]” with “distress [pressura]”, “since distress 
implies them [pressura in semet maestitudinem atque furorem continent]”. Leonides, however, 
may not have meant what Caelius here attributes to him. ‘Pressura’ can mean ‘distress’ or ‘deep 
sleep’. It may be equivalent to Greek κῶμα (‘deep sleep’); νάρκη (‘torpor,’ ‘numbness’); perhaps 
also καταφορά (‘sinking’). For examples, see [Gal.] Def. Med. 235 (XIX.413 K.) and [Gal.] Int. 
13.25 (XIV.741 K. = 57,23 Petit). Aretaeus calls lethargy ‘gloom’ (ζόφος) at CA 1.2.1 (5.1.2, 
98,9 Hude). The adjective ‘gloomy’ (ζοφώδης) is used in [Gal.] Int. 13.24 to describe melancholia 
(XIV.741 K. = 57,14 Petit). Caelius also seems to acknowledge this equivocation elsewhere. He 
mentions people who associate pressura with sleep, but he claims they are wrong and that 
“distress differs from sleep [differre pressuram a somno]” at Acut. 1.1.16-17 (30,13-27 Bendz). 
Leonides may have been one of those Caelius has in mind, but he does not say. 
33 On lethargy as an acute disease: for example, Celsus, Med. 3.20 (129,2-4 Marx); [Gal.] Def. 
Med. 135 (XIX.387 K.); Aretaeus CA 2.2, (5.2.2, 98,8 Hude); Cael. Aurel., Acut. 1.2.1(130,4-8 
Bendz). 
34 Caelius says Asclepiades did not give a definition of lethargy: “Asclepiades does not define 
this affection [Asclepiades hanc passionem non definit]” at Acut. 2.1.5 (132,21 Bendz). If what 
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independent report of Athenaeus’ definition of lethargy, we cannot rule out that 
the dispute was terminological and that Athenaeus and the others might have 
been using ‘madness’ and ‘delirium’ in different senses.34F35 In fact, Galen warns 
that “all these so-called Pneumatists conform to the opinion of the Stoics, so that 
since Chrysippus accustomed them to dispute about philosophical terms, they do 
not hesitate to do the same thing about medical ones.”35F36 Galen’s warning, 
although mentioned in the context of descriptions of the pulse, is general enough 
to suggest the “love for contentiousness among them (sc. the Pneumatists) [τῆς 
ἐν αὐτοῖς φιλονεικείας]” 36F37 was not limited to that context; it also suggests the 
Pneumatists may have been content to adopt Stoic terminology and concepts, 
ignoring existing medical ones. Athenaeus may well have believed lethargy to be 
an acute disease and used the general Stoic term for madness. Without further 
evidence, the details of the dispute will remain murky. 
Although Athenaeus’ positive views are difficult to reconstruct from this 
dispute, the dispute itself shows that Athenaeus was in dialogue with other 
doctors about the description and classification of disease types on the basis of 
mental symptoms. And like other doctors, Athenaeus believed these diseases to 
have underlying physiological correlates. Evidence about Athenaeus’ views on 
the physiology of mental disease comes from two reports in Galen, one about the 
physiology of melancholia, the other about the treatment of phrenitis. 
Athenaeus believed melancholia was related to a dyskrasia or bad mixture of 
the elementary qualities (hot, cold, wet and dry). In On Mixtures, Galen reports 
that the followers of Athenaeus deny any disease can be characterized as hot and 
wet but “in every case [disease] is either hot and dry like fever, cold and wet like 
dropsy, or cold and dry like melancholia.” 37F38 If Athenaeus’ views are accurately 
 
he attributes to Asclepiades in our passage is not a definition, there is less reason to suppose the 
claim he attributes to Athenaeus is a proper definition either. 
35Another example of terminological variation can be found in Aretaeus’ definition of μανία: 
“an extremely chronic distraction [ἔκστασις γάρ ἐστι τὸ ξύμπαν χρόνιος] without fever” (Aret. 
SD 1.6.1 = 3.6.1, 41,13 Hude). Aretaeus considers μανία to be a species of ἔκστασις, as 
(presumably) Asclepiades did. But Aretaeus also distinguishes φρενῖτις and μανία differently 
from Asclepiades: he thinks φρένιτις is an acute affection involving injury to the head and senses, 
which in turn leads to hallucination (much like Asclepiades’ alienatio); μανία, on the other hand, 
is a chronic disease whose cause is in the viscera, and which causes failures in thinking, but not 
sensation. See Aretaeus, CD 1.6 (3.6, 41,12-43,28 Hude). [Gal.] Def. Med. gives almost the exact 
opposite description: “ἔκστασις is short-term μανία” ([Gal.] Def. Med. 485, XIX.462 K.). 
36 Gal. Diff. Puls. 3.1 (VIII.641-642 K.): ἀρέσκονται γὰρ οὗτοι πάντες οἱ Πνευματικοὶ 
καλούμενοι τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς δόγμασιν. ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ Χρύσιππος αὐτοὺς εἴθισεν ἀμφισβητεῖν περὶ 
τῶν κατὰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὀνομάτων, οὐδ’ αὐτοὶ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν ταῦτα ποιεῖν 
ὀκνοῦσι. Cf. Galen Diff. Puls. 2.9 (VIII.630-31 K.). 
37 Gal. Diff. Puls. 3.1 (VIII.642 K.). 
38 Gal. Temp. 1.3 (I.522 K. = 8,28-9,6 Helmreich): “When attacking these kinds of arguments 
[against the non-existence of hot/wet diseases], some of the followers of Athenaeus of Attalia 
force the issue, saying there is nothing wrong with a wet and hot condition, and asserting that no 
illness has been discovered that is wet and hot; rather, in every case [illness] is either hot and dry 
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represented by his followers, it seems he thought melancholia was to be 
explained in terms similar to any other disease. Galen’s association of 
melancholia with a cold-dry mixture may be an arbitrary example on his part; 
nevertheless, its inclusion here suggests Athenaeus would agree that health and 
disease of either soul or the body are associated with mixtures of elementary 
qualities: health, with a hot and wet mixture (κρᾶσις); disease, with any mixture 
that deviates from this.38F39 
Regarding phrenitis, we only have reports about how Athenaeus’ followers 
treated the disease. Galen reports that they would apply oxyrrhodinum, a cooling-
agent, to the head; they would remove the hair and occasionally apply other 
cooling herbs; and if the disease became chronic, they would also apply cupping 
instruments.39F40 Galen finds this treatment puzzling, since, he says, “the 
hēgemonikon has been injured in those who are delirious, and according to 
Athenaeus this is in the heart.”40F41 This treatment, however, was common. Both 
Celsus and Aretaeus recommend it is a means of reducing fever,41F42 and Aretaeus 
says explicitly that the remedy is to be applied to the head “for the sake of 
refrigeration.”42F43 It is likely that Athenaeus’ followers, too, performed this 
treatment as a means of reducing the heat accompanying fever. Such a treatment 
would also be consistent with Athenaeus’ view that fever is associated with a 
dyskrasia that tends to hot and dry. This leaves open how phrenitis would differ 
from fever if they are both hot and dry, but, on this question, our sources are 
 
like fever, cold and wet like dropsy, or cold and dry like melancholia [πρὸς δὴ τοὺς τοιούτους 
λόγους ἀπομαχόμενοί τινες τῶν ἀπ’ Ἀθηναίου τοῦ Ἀτταλέως ὁμόσε χωροῦσιν οὔτε κατάστασιν 
ὑγρὰν καὶ θερμὴν μέμφεσθαι λέγοντες οὔθ’ εὑρεθῆναί τι νόσημα φάσκοντες ὑγρὸν καὶ θερμόν, 
ἀλλὰ πάντως ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ὑπάρχειν ὡς τὸν πυρετόν, ἢ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν ὡς τὸν ὕδερον, 
ἢ ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ὡς τὴν μελαγχολίαν]”, tr. Singer (modified). 
39 Athenaeus also associated mixtures with times of the year and times of life. On the various 
associations of mixtures with temporal cycles: times of day, of month, of year in Aëtius of Amida, 
Libri medicinales 3.162 (332,1-17 Olivieri); times of year, times of life in Galen, In Hippocratis 
De aere, aquis, locis commentaria, part of which is edited and translated in Anastassiou, A. and 
Irmer, D. (2001). Testimonien zum Corpus Hippocraticum. Teil II.2: Hippokrateszitate in den 
übrigen Werken Galens einschließlich der alten Pseudo-Galenica, 365; and Gal. Temp. 1.3 (I.522 
K. = 9,6-10 Helmreich). I thank Peter Singer for pressing me on this point. On the difficulties 
concerning Galen’s treatment of these topics see, Singer, P. N. (2014). ‘The Fight for Health: 
Tradition, Competition, Subdivision and Philosophy in Galen’s Hygienic Writings’. British 
Journal for the History of Philosophy, 22.5: 978-9. 
40 Galen, De methodo medendi (= Gal. MM) 12.21 (X.928-29 K.). 
41 Gal. MM 12.21 (X.928 K.): βεβλάφθαι μὲν γὰρ τῷ παραφρονοῦντι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, εἶναι δ’ 
ἐν καρδίᾳ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν Ἀθήναιον. 
42 Celsus, Med. 3.18.9 (124,5-8 Marx); Aretaeus, CA 1.1.10 (5.1.10, 93,29-94,1 Hude). 
43 Aretaeus, CA 1.1.10 (5.1.10, 93,29-30 Hude): τέγγειν δὲ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐς ἔμψυξιν. Aretaeus 
also suggests applying cupping instruments to the head “if the derangement [παραφορή] does not 
abate at all by any of [the standard means of reducing inflammation (φλεγμονή)]” (96,15-16 
Hude). The view that the brain is an organ for refrigeration is Aristotle’s. See e.g. De partibus 
animalium (= PA) 2.7, 652b6-23. Athenaeus’ followers, however, need not have held this view. 
See Lewis, 000. 
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silent. 
 
III – Mental Exercise 
 
The reports concerning Athenaeus’ understanding of mental disease all suggest 
he assumes a correlation between physiology and mental health. The dispute over 
Athenaeus’ description of lethargy shows that he thinks the impairment of mental 
activities is associated with some bodily condition. In the cases of melancholia 
and phrenitis, he seems to accept the view that they are associated with a 
dyskrasia of the elementary qualities of the body, although the precise nature of 
the relationship between the mixture and the soul’s activities are left unexplained. 
He may think they are related as cause and effect,43F44 that they have a common 
cause, or that impairment of mental activities followed certain mixtures or bodily 
conditions.44F45 
Athenaeus also thinks that the soul’s activities influence those underlying 
bodily conditions. Specifically, he claims that rational activity is a kind of 
exercise which has bodily correlates. By rational activities, he means, for 
instance, studies (μαθήματα), concerns (φροντίδες) 45F46, and concentration 
(ἐπιμέλεια); and in this context he also mentions specific sciences, such as 
mathematics, philosophy, grammar and medicine—what he calls more generally 
‘culture’ (παιδεία) and ‘rational study’ (μάθησις λογική). When he recommends 
these activities in a hygienic context, he refers to them as exercises of the soul 
(γυμνάσια τῆς ψυχῆς)—’psychic exercises.’ The reason he extends the term 
‘exercise’ to rational activity suggests Athenaeus sees an analogy between 
training that strengthens the body and training which strengthens the soul. Yet, 
Athenaeus does not say, as one might expect, that the purpose of psychic exercise 
is psychological health. Rather, he says it is to be done for the sake of the body. 
Take, for example, his discussion of regimen for women: 
Τὸ κατεψυγμένον τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ κάθυγρον τῆς συστάσεως διορθωτέον 
τῇ θερμοτέρᾳ καὶ ξηροτέρᾳ διαίτῃ. […] γυμνάσια δ’ ἐπιτρεπτέον τὰ 
γυναιξὶν ἁρμόζοντα, ψυχῆς μὲν τὰ διὰ τῶν οἰκείων αὐταῖς μαθημάτων καὶ 
τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν φροντίδων· «ψυχῆς γὰρ περίπατος φροντὶς 
ἀνθρώποισι»46F47, ὡς εἶπεν ὁ παλαιὸς Ἱπποκράτης· σώματος δὲ διὰ τῆς 
ταλασιουργίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν πόνων. ἐπιθεωρείτωσαν 
γὰρ αἱ μὲν δεσπόζουσαι τὰς δεσποζομένας, αἱ δ’ ὑγρῶς καὶ τρυφερῶς 
 
44 The treatment of phrenitis, whose aim is to cool the head, certainly hints that it is the 
excessive heat of fever which causes injury to the hegemonikon, the rational faculty of the soul. 
45 For Athenaeus’ views on causation, see Hankinson, R. (1999). Cause and Explanation in 
Ancient Greek Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 377-78. 
46 On the translation of this term, see below, n. 50. 
47 The passage marked as a quotation is taken from Hippocrates, Epidemics 6.5.5 (V.316 L.). 
I discuss it in detail below, 000-000. 
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βιοῦσαι τὰς αὐτουργούς, ὅσῳ διαφέρουσιν αὐτῶν πρός τε ὑγίειαν καὶ πρὸς 
σύλληψιν καὶ πρὸς εὐτοκίαν διά τε τὴν λιτότητα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τὴν 
γυμνασίαν τοῦ σώματος. χρήσιμον οὖν «ἐπισκέψασθαι σιτοποιόν, 
παραστῆσαι δὲ καὶ ἀπομετρῆσαι ταμιείᾳ, περιελθεῖν δὲ σκοπουμένην, εἰ 
κατὰ χώραν ἔχει ᾗ δεῖ ἕκαστα· ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ μοι ἅμα ἐπιμελείας εἶναι 
καὶ περιπάτου. ἀγαθὸν δὲ γυμνάσιον καὶ δεῦσαι καὶ μάξαι καὶ στρώματα 
ἀναθεῖναι. γυμναζομένην οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐσθίειν ἥδιον καὶ 
εὐχροωτέραν εἶναι.»47F48 
The cold and wet constitution of women should be corrected with a regimen 
that is drier and hotter. […] One must encourage exercises [γυμνάσια] that 
are suitable for women: of the soul, [exercise] by means of the studies 
proper for women and concerns about the household, since “concern, for 
people, is the soul’s [way of] talking a walk”; of the body, [exercise] by 
means of spinning wool and the other work around the house. For, let the 
governesses observe the women they govern, and those who live softly and 
luxuriously, those who do the work themselves, how they differ from them 
with respect to health, pregnancy, and ease of labour, because of the 
simplicity of their food and the exercise of their body. It is useful therefore 
“to observe the baker, to stand by and measure out [supplies] with the 
housekeeper, to go around [the house] examining whether each thing is in 
the place it is supposed to be. For these seem to me to be something 
requiring concentration and a walk at the same time. It is also good exercise 
to mix and knead [dough], and to lay out the bedspreads. If she exercises in 
this way, then necessarily eating will be more pleasant and she will have a 
healthier complexion.” 
In this text, Athenaeus distinguishes between exercises of the soul and those of 
the body. The soul’s exercises are described as ‘studies’ (μαθήματα) and 
‘concerns’ (φροντίδες), while the body’s are ‘exertions’ (πόνοι).48F49 The activities 
he associates with the soul are activities it carries out by itself, what we might 
call mental activities.49F50 That he has mental activities in mind is also implied by 
 
48 ‘On Regimen for Women’, Orib. Coll. med. (lib. inc.) 21.1-8 (112,14-33 Raeder). The final 
part of this passage is a quotation from Xenophon, Oeconomicus 10.10-11. See below n. 63. 
49 As we will see, Athenaeus adopts this distinction from a passage in the Hippocratic 
Epidemics 6, but his is almost certainly an idiosyncratic interpretation. There was considerable 
debate about which activities to assign to the body, and which to the soul. The debate is 
summarized in Ps.-Plutarch, Fragmenta: πότερον ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος ἐπιθυμία καὶ λύπη 6: “you 
are looking for boundary marks between body and soul; but nature has removed them, using all 
her skill to make one substance out of two” (Sandbach trans). 
50 ‘Studies’ (μαθήματα) are clearly mental activities. ‘Concerns’ (φροντίδες), while it often 
connotes ‘distress’ or ‘worry’, is also being used to describe mental activity, what he also refers 
to in this passage as “concentration” or “careful attention” (ἐπιμελείας). Athenaeus is adopting 
the term from ‘Hippocrates’, Epidemics 6, and in his commentary on the passage, Galen confirms 
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the particular exercises he recommends, like observing, measuring, and 
examining. These activities, he says, are “something requiring concentration 
(ἐπιμέλεια) and a walk (περίπατος) at the same time,” but it is the way these 
mental exercises are carried out in this case, by observing the baker, measuring 
supplies, and examining things around the house, that explains why they involve 
bodily exercise in addition. One could equally carry them out without physical 
exercise, but Athenaeus thinks both body and soul should be exercised, and if 
they can be exercised together, then all the better. What he calls “exercises of the 
soul,” therefore, involve specifically mental activities. Whatever the effect of this 
exercise, he thinks it arises independently of the exercise of the body. 
Yet, while he recognizes distinct mental and bodily activities, Athenaeus 
thinks they have the same effect. He recommends mental and bodily exercise in 
order to correct the “cold and wet constitution of women,” and both are part of a 
regimen he calls “hotter and drier.” The term ‘exercise’ must mean something 
like ‘an activity which causes heat and dryness to the body’; and he refers to 
mental and bodily activities as ‘exercises’ because he thinks they each have this 
heating and drying effect. At the same time, he refers to “those who live softly 
and luxuriously” in opposition to those who do the work themselves, which 
suggests ‘exercise’ also has something to do with strength: the soul, like the body, 
is strengthened by exercise. But the goal of this psychological and physical 
regimen likely means he does not intend “mental gymnastics” to be taken as a 
metaphor for an activity which strengthens the mind’s ability to think.50F51 Instead, 
he is using the term ‘exercise’ to refer to an activity which increases the effect of 
heating and drying. Mental and physical exercises may be distinguished insofar 
as they are different sources of this effect, but as exercises, Athenaeus considers 
their effect to be the same. 
Athenaeus also claims that two conditions accompany the correction of the 
body’s constitution—more pleasant eating and improved complexion—and both 
are associated with the body becoming warmer in other sources. Plutarch, for 
instance, mentions a contemporary medical view that “exercise, shouting, and 
anything that increases heat through movement causes one to be more pleased 
and more eager to eat.”51F52 In his commentary on the Hippocratic Epidemics 6, 
 
this is how φροντίδες was generally understood: “For, after all, acts of thinking [διανοήσεις] are 
called ‘concerns’ [φροντίδες], whence even Socrates was called ‘concerned’ [φροντιστὴν] and 
the man’s wise counsels were called ‘concerns’ [φροντίδας], as indeed one can find in the Clouds 
of Aristophanes, where he makes fun of and mocks Socrates as an idle-talker”. Galen, In 
Hippocratis Epidemiarum librum VI commentaria (= Gal. Hipp. Epid.) 6.5.11 (XVIIB.263.9-13 
K. = 280,6-281,6 Wenkenbach). 
51 It has been taken this way by Jaeger and Kudlien. See below, 000. 
52 Plut. Quaes. Conv. 6.1 (Moralia 687a2-4): “αὐτόν θ’ ἕκαστον αὑτοῦ γυμνάσια καὶ κραυγαὶ 
καὶ ὅσα τῷ κινεῖν αὔξει τὸ θερμὸν ἥδιον φαγεῖν ποιεῖ καὶ προθυμότερον”. One is more pleased 
and more eager because the increase in internal heat causes a greater than normal depletion of 
nutriment in the body, and so a greater amount of pleasure when restored. Plutarch says youth 
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Galen discusses the claim that a doctor can induce anger (ὀξυθυμία) and other 
emotional responses in a patient “for the sake of restoring color and humours.”52F53 
He interprets the claim to refer to the increase in heat caused by the emotional 
response.53F54 The conditions which Athenaeus says accompany mental exercise are 
therefore consistent with the conclusion that mental exercise heats the body. 
Athenaeus says nothing explicit about the physiology of mental exercise, and 
other fragments and testimony are equally silent on this question.54F55 We are better 
informed about Athenaeus’ understanding of the soul, and it is tempting to 
reconstruct Athenaeus’ physiology of mental exercise based on this testimony. 
Galen and pseudo-Galen report that Athenaeus identifies the soul with pneuma 
or breath, a corporeal substance distributed throughout the body, which holds the 
body together.55F56 Galen also reports that Athenaeus identifies pneuma with the 
innate heat responsible for the growth and maintenance of the human body.56F57 The 
movement or exercise of the pneuma could correspond to an increase in the 
strength of the innate heat, which would lead in turn to the heating of the body. 
That Athenaeus is committed to something like this view is suggested by 
fragments in which he associates excessive mental activity with the corruption of 
the body, and moderate emotional activity with good-nurture.57F58 This picture is as 
close as we get to a physiology of the mental in Athenaeus’ writings, and it is 
quite possible that he did not give a physiological explanation at all.58F59 
Whatever the physiology of mental activities, Athenaeus believes that their 
effects require regulation. Implicit in the distinction of exercises into 
psychological and bodily kinds is the claim that both are part of δίαιτα or 
 
are hungrier and the elderly less hungry for the same reason. See Plutarch, Moralia 686f. Aspasius 
makes a similar point regarding exercise: “a decent person will try to make foods and drinks 
pleasant [ἡδέα καὶ τὰ βρώματα καὶ τὰ ποτά] through exercise and exertion [διὰ γυμνασίων καὶ 
πόνων]” (Aspasius, In Ethica Nicomachea commentaria, CAG XIX.1 156,6-7 Heylbut). 
Athenaeus associates good appetite and digestion with ‘keener perception’ (εὐαισθητοτέρους) at 
Orib. Collectiones Medicae 9.5 (8,7-32 Raeder), which could be an alternative reason why mental 
exercise makes food more pleasant: one can perceive it better. But if this is what he means, it 
would leave unexplained the connection to the change in the woman’s constitution. 
53 The comment is in Gal. Hipp. Epid. VI (see note 54), although the passage is from 
Hippocrates, Epidemics 2.4 (68,4-6 Smith = V.126 L.): ἐπιτηδεύειν ὀξυθυμίην ἐμποιέειν καὶ 
χρώματος ἀναλήψιος ἕνεκα καὶ ἐγχυμώσιος, καὶ εὐθυμίας, καὶ φόβους, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. 
54 Gal. Hipp. Epid. VI, 6.5.9 (XVIIB.259-60 K. = 278,10-12 Wenkebach): τοῦτο γάρ τοι καὶ 
<κατὰ> τὸ δεύτερον τῶν Ἐπιδημιῶν ἐδείκνυμεν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ δεδιδαγμένον, ἡνίκ’ ἔλεγεν· 
«ἐπιτηδεύειν ὀξυθυμίην ἐμποιέειν καὶ χροιῆς ἀναλήψιος ἕνεκα καὶ <ἐγ>χυμώσιος». 
55 Presumably, as Peter Singer suggests to me, it will have something to do with the activity 
of the innate heat in the heart, where, according to Galen, Athenaeus located the hēgemonikon. 
See above, 000. 
56 Gal. CC 2.3 (55,18-24 Lyons = 134,15-19 Kalbfleisch); [Gal.] Int. 9 (XIV 698-99 K = 
22,10-17 Petit). 
57 Gal. Hipp. Aer. in Anastassiou and Irmer, Testimonien, 365. The comment concerns Hp. 
Aer 1.1 (II.12 L. = 24,3-6 Diller). 
58 These effects are attributed by other medical and philosophical writers to variations in the 
heat of the soul. See n. 61 below. 
59 See n. 61 below on Hippocrates, Vict. 2.61. 
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regimen. Regimen traditionally included the regulation of exercise, in the 
straightforward sense of bodily exercise, along with foods, drinks, sleep and 
sexual activity—anything we habitually do that influences the state of our body. 
Yet, the criterion that more generally determines whether something is a part of 
regimen or not is the extent to which something which affects our health is under 
our control in the first place. Like earlier philosophers and doctors, 59F60 Athenaeus 
thinks mental activity can influence our bodily health, but he also thinks that 
mental activities are to some extent voluntary. We can choose when to study and 
what things to think about, just as we can choose what things to eat or drink and 
when to sleep. Athenaeus, therefore, thinks doctors should know how to instruct 
a patient to use and regulate mental activity in order to promote health, just as 
they regulate traditional aspects of regimen like physical activity, foods and 
drinks. He recognizes a distinction between the kinds of activities proper to both 
body and soul; but insofar as both can be regulated, he sees no distinction in their 
place in a programme of healthy regimen.60F61 
Athenaeus, however, does not portray himself as innovating. His strategy for 
justifying this regimen is to show that mental exercises were recognized by ‘the 
ancients.’ 61F62 Hippocrates is his explicit authority in this case, yet Athenaeus wants 
to show that it was a view held by others as well. While he is not named in the 
text, a large section of the fragment—nearly a quarter—is taken verbatim from 
Xenophon’s Oeconomicus. 62F63 Athenaeus could have been plagiarising, but it is 
 
60 See, e.g., Hippocrates, De victu (= Hipp. Vict.) 2.61 (VI.574 L. = 184,7-13 Joly-Byl); Plato, 
Timaeus, 88a3-7; Aristotle, De Anima 1.1, 403a22-24; Rhetoric 2.13, 1389b31. 
61 Athenaeus is not the first medical writer to incorporate mental activity into regimen because 
of its physiological effects. The Hippocratic author of Regimen also recognized thought 
(μερίμνης) as a form of exercise, and recommended that it be regulated precisely because it causes 
heating and drying. But the author of Regimen does not adopt any systematic distinction between 
bodily and psychological exercise or activity. Instead, he distinguishes between ‘natural’ and 
‘violent’ exercises: “of exercises, some are natural, others violent [περὶ δὲ τῶν πόνων ... οἱ μὲν 
κατὰ φύσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ βίης] (Vict. 2.61, VI.574 L. = 184,7-8 Joly-Byl). See Bartoš, On Regimen, 
199-201. 
62 He uses the same strategy to justify his element theory. See [Gal.] Def. Med. 31 (XIX.356 
K.). On this, see also Leith, D. ‘Galen’s Refutation of Atomism’ in Adamson P., Hansberger R., 
Wilberding J. (2014). Philosophical Themes in Galen, 213-34; Kupreeva, A. ‘Galen’s Theory of 
Elements’ in Adamson, P., Hansberger, R., Wilberding, J. (2014). Philosophical Themes in 
Galen, 153-96. 
63 Xen. Oec. 10.10-11: “This was my advice… ‘Look after the baking-maid: stand by the 
housekeeper when she is serving out stores: go round and see whether everything is in its place’. 
For I thought that would give her a walk as well as occupation. I also said it was excellent exercise 
to mix flour and knead dough; and to shake and fold cloaks and bedclothes; such exercise would 
give her a better appetite, improve her health, and add natural colour to her cheeks [καὶ ἐγὼ 
μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, συνεβούλευον […]: ἐπισκέψασθαι δὲ καὶ σιτοποιόν, παραστῆναι δὲ 
καὶ ἀπομετρούσῃ τῇ ταμίᾳ, περιελθεῖν δ’ ἐπισκοπουμένην καὶ εἰ κατὰ χώραν ἔχει ᾗ δεῖ ἕκαστα. 
ταῦτα γὰρ ἐδόκει μοι ἅμα ἐπιμέλεια εἶναι καὶ περίπατος. ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἔφην εἶναι γυμνάσιον καὶ τὸ 
δεῦσαι καὶ μάξαι καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ στρώματα ἀνασεῖσαι καὶ συνθεῖναι. γυμναζομένην δὲ ἔφην 
οὕτως ἂν καὶ ἐσθίειν ἥδιον καὶ ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον καὶ εὐχροωτέραν φαίνεσθαι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ]” (trans. 
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more likely that he expects his readers to be familiar with Xenophon’s Socratic 
writings, and is attempting to position his interpretation of Hippocrates as one 
that was recognized by Hippocrates’ contemporaries.63F64 One reason to make 
Xenophon’s advice resemble Hippocrates’ is to add support to his interpretation 
of the passage from Epidemics 6. A more effective strategy, however, would be 
to show that the importance of psychological and bodily training was recognized 
by all the ancients, a strategy Athenaeus engages in elsewhere. Still, it is not 
obvious that either Hippocrates or Xenophon held the view Athenaeus ascribes 
to them, and Athenaeus seems to have been challenged by later interpreters on 
precisely this point. 
The portion of ‘Regimen for Women’ that comes from Xenophon includes all 
the advice about particular exercises, like inspecting with the baker and laying 
out the bedspreads, and the reference to pleasant eating and good complexion. At 
this point in the dialogue, a character named Ischomachus is telling Socrates 
about the advice he gave to his wife when she asked him how she could look 
beautiful without wearing makeup. His advice was to do things “that would give 
her a walk as well as an occupation (ἅμα ἐπιμέλεια εἶναι καὶ περίπατος).” The 
result, he says, will be “a better appetite, better health and a better complexion.” 
Athenaeus agrees with this advice, but he changes the text slightly, implying that 
these tasks involve the exercise of both body and soul (ἅμα ἐπιμελείας εἶναι καὶ 
περιπάτου). The distinction between exercises of soul and body, however, is not 
just absent from Xenophon’s text, but it also significantly distorts Xenophon’s 
advice. The point of Xenophon’s advice is that the occupation of running a house 
does not involve exercise, and so to be healthy one needs to walk around as well. 
Athenaeus’ reading of Xenophon, on the other hand, brings him much closer to 
the kind of soul-body regimen Plato recommends in the Timaeus, but which he 
attributes to Hippocrates. 
Athenaeus mentions Hippocrates explicitly as an authority in this passage to 
justify the importance of mental activity to the health of the body.64F65 The aphorism 
 
Marchant, Todd and Henderson). 
  
64 Glenn Most suggests to me that Athenaeus may be reciting Xenophon from memory, and 
is perhaps unnamed because he is not a medical authority. Galen mentions a similar instance of 
Athenaeus’ ‘plagiarising’ in Trem. Palp. 6 (VII.609-10 K.), where Athenaeus copies a passage 
from Plato’s Timaeus, apparently without attribution: “[Athenaeus] writes: ‘now from this 
resistance and shaking, tremor and rigor follow, while the whole affection is cold; and the agent 
itself has this name’, he says, ‘as Plato says somewhere as well’. For he has written Plato’s text 
itself. The whole [passage from Plato] is as follows […] [ὑπογράφων τε τὸ ῥῖγος ὧδέ πώς φησι· 
τῇ δὴ μάχῃ καὶ τῷ σεισμῷ τούτῳ τρόμος καὶ ῥῖγος ἕπεται, ψυχρὸν δὲ τὸ πάθος ἅπαν. τοῦτο καὶ 
τὸ δρῶν αὐτὸ ἔσχεν ὄνομα, ὥς πού, φησι, καὶ ὁ Πλάτων λέγει. οὗτος γὰρ αὐτὴν τὴν λέξιν εἴρηκε 
τοῦ Πλάτωνος. ἔχει δὲ ἡ σύμπασα τόνδε τὸν τρόπον…]” 
  
65 Thanks to Chiara Thumiger who originally pointed out to me the importance of this 
reference to Hippocrates. 
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he quotes is found at Epidemics 6.5.5: 
πόνος τοῖσιν ἄρθροισι καὶ σαρκὶ σῖτος ὕπνος σπλάγχνοισιν. Ψυχῆς 
περίπατος φροντὶς ἀνθρώποισιν.65F66 
Exertion for the joints and for flesh food sleep for the viscera. Concern is a 
soul’s taking a walk for people. 
The aphorism is notoriously obscure.66F67 Athenaeus only quotes the second 
sentence, but he seems to have had it all in mind since he adopts the terms 
“exertion” (πόνος) and “concern (or thought)” (φροντίς) to refer to bodily and 
mental exercise respectively. This is certainly one way the passage could be read, 
and in his commentary on it, Galen mentions that some interpreters took both 
“exertion” (πόνος) and “walk” (περίπατος) to be synonyms for “exercise” 
(γυμνάσιον), as Athenaeus seems to do; but Galen also tells us there are differing 
opinions about its interpretation, especially concerning the part quoted by 
Athenaeus, and he goes out of his way to reject them. Whatever Galen’s reasons 
for thinking that the view attributed to Hippocrates by earlier interpreters is 
implausible, it seems that this view, or something close to it, is the view 
Athenaeus holds. Athenaeus calls thinking a form of exercise, incorporates into 
regimen and attributes the view to Hippocrates. 
Galen says the first part of the passage was relatively uncontentious. Most 
interpreters, he says, take “exertion” to refer to the strengthening effect of 
exercise, something like ‘exercise causes strengthening or growth of the joints, 
food of the flesh, while sleep strengthens the viscera.’ These interpreters have 
this much in common with Athenaeus. And while it is the majority view, Galen 
is much less impressed with reading the second part in a similar way: 
All the book’s interpreters take “walk” [περίπατον] to mean ‘exercise 
[γυμνάσιον],’ so that the sentence means: ‘for people, concerns [αἱ 
φροντίδες] are an exercise.’ They think [Hippocrates] has used the common 
term ‘walk,’ because the word denotes a form of exercise. Dioscorides, 
however, who reasonably avoided this interpretation because its style is 
affected [κακοζήλου δὲ τῆς ἑρμηνείας οὔσης], did not write “περίπατος” 
 
66 Gal. Hipp. Epid. VI, 6.5.10-11 (XVIIB.260-262 K. = 278,13-280,5 Wenkebach). The text 
corresponds to Hippocrates, Epidemics 6.5.5 (V.316 L.). 
67 The best modern study of this passage is Kudlien, F. (1962). ‘Zur Interpretation eines 
hippokratischen Aphorismus’. Sudhoffs Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin und der 
Naturwissenschaften 46.4, 289–94. It is briefly mentioned by Jaeger, Paideia, vol. 3, 30 and 298 
n.73. It is also discussed by Deichgräber, K. (1933). Die Epidemien und das Corpus 
Hippocraticum, 53-55, who takes the point to be that thinking is literally the wandering of the 
soul in the body. In response, Jaeger asserts (without much evidence) that it cannot mean this. 
For Jaeger, what is new in the Hippocratic aphorism at Epid. 6.5.5 is the transposition of the 
concept of exercise from the bodily to the psychological realm. This seems to be how Athenaeus 
and Galen take it as well (for different reasons), but the claim is not as clear or free of difficulties 
as any of them make it seem. 
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[sc. in his edition], but added the letter ‘nu,’ [so that it read] “περὶ παντός” 
[sc. “above all”]. 67F68 
Galen prefers Dioscorides’ emended reading because, he thinks, it is absurd to 
suppose Hippocrates meant thinking is an exercise. Such an interpretation, he 
says, is κακόζηλος, i.e., said in an affected way. Galen uses this term when he 
wants to reject a competing interpretation on grounds of its implausibility.68F69 In 
his commentary on Epidemics 6.5.14, for example, Galen mentions an 
interpretation of the aphorism “weaker foods have a short life-time [ὀλιγοχρόνιον 
βιοτὴν].” 69F70 In  this interpretation, the phrase “short life-time” is expanded to 
mean something like ‘weaker food persists in living [μονὴν ζωὴν] for a short 
time’ after it has been ingested, an interpretation Galen thinks is implausible, 
since it is strange to talk of food having a life-span.70F71 The natural way Galen 
thinks one should understand the claim “weaker foods have a short life-time” is 
that they provide less sustenance, in other words, that they are used up and 
expelled rapidly. Galen’s criticism about περίπατος is roughly similar: he seems 
to agree that if Hippocrates used περίπατος as a synonym for ‘exercise,’ then 
what Hippocrates wrote would be implausible, and so he adopts Dioscorides’ 
emendation to avoid this conclusion. He does not say, however, why he thinks 
the reading would be affected or implausible. It cannot be that he thinks 
Hippocrates is not thinking about mental training. He clearly agrees that this is 
what Hippocrates is talking about, a point we will return to shortly. Perhaps, then, 
he is rejecting the reading on stylistic grounds, but if he is, I do not see what they 
might have been. What seems reasonably clear, however, is that Galen wants to 
place some distance between the items in the analogy, between concern and 
physical exercise, particularly to avoid the conclusion that thinking literally 
constitutes a kind of physical exercise. 
There is one more piece of evidence which places Athenaeus’ use of 
Hippocrates within the broader context of how ancient medicine adopted themes 
from ancient psychology. In his remarks that follow the interpretation of 
 
68 Gal. Hipp. Epid. VI, 6.5.11 (XVIIB.263 K. = 280,8-14 Wenkebach): τὸν «περίπατον» ἀντὶ 
τοῦ γυμνασίου πάντες ἤκουσαν οἱ ἐξηγησάμενοι τὸ βιβλίον, ἵν’ ὁ λόγος ᾖ τοιόσδε· «τοῖς 
ἀνθρώποις αἱ φροντίδες γυμνάσιον», <νομίσαντες αὐτὸν τῇ> προσηγορίᾳ κεχρῆσθαι τῇ τοῦ 
«περιπάτου», δηλούσης τῆς φωνῆς ταύτης εἶδός τι γυμνασίου. κακοζήλου δὲ τῆς ἑρμηνείας 
οὔσης, εἰκότως αὐτὴν ὁ Διοσκουρίδης φυλαττόμενος, οὐ «περίπατος» ἔγραψεν, ἀλλὰ προσθεὶς 
τὸ «ν» γράμμα, «περὶ παντὸς». 
69 According to Hermogenes, κακόζηλος describes a figure of speech that is implausible or 
unconvincing, either for reasons of impossibility, inconsistency, ugliness, impiety, injustice, or 
contrariness to nature—something that makes us think, “that does not seem do-able [οὐκ εἰκὸς 
τόδε πραχθῆναι]” (Herm. Inv. 4.12 Rabe). One example he uses is Hom. Od. 9.481 where 
Odysseus says the Cyclops, Polyphemus, “lobbed the peak of a great mountain [at us] after having 
snapped it off [ἧκε δ᾽ ἀπορρήξας κορυφὴν ὄρεος μεγάλοιο]”. 
70 Hippocrates, Epid. 6.5.14 (244, 14-15 Smith = V.318,20 L.): τὰ ἀσθενέστερα 
[ἀσθενέστατα: Smith] σιτία ὀλιγοχρόνιον βιοτὴν ἔχει. 
71 Gal. Hipp. Epid. VI, 6.5.21 (XVIIB.282 K. = 299,20-21 Wenkebach). 
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περίπατος, Galen places this passage within a debate about the extent to which 
medicine is responsible for discussing matters to do with the soul. Not only was 
the interpretation of this passage contentious, but Galen also alludes to a question 
about the extent to which this passage belongs to medicine at all. He writes, 
But if it should seem to anyone that the phrase belongs to philosophical 
speculation, not medicine—first, let them consider that it applies to all the 
rational arts in which one needs to exercise reasoning [ἐν αἷς τὸν λογισμὸν 
χρὴ γυμνάζειν], as it has been said by many other physicians, and not a few 
times by Erasistratus. 71F72 And furthermore, certain affections occur, some, 
for instance, which numb the soul’s rational faculty and the faculty of 
memory, others which are stuporific [καρώδη] and soporific [καταφορικά]. 
In these cases, one must consider thinking to be beneficial, as in other 
places he [sc. Hippocrates] taught that anger is useful for good humour and 
regaining a state in accordance with nature. 72F73 
Galen offers two reasons why this passage is relevant to medicine. First, he gives 
a kind of meta-defence, appealing to Erasistratus, that through practice one can 
improve one’s performance in any rational art.73F74 According to this defence, 
Hippocrates’ claim applies to medicine because, like any rational endeavour, 
medicine requires thinking, and thinking requires practice. The fact that Galen 
mentions Erasistratus here, and that this defence seems to imply the unemended 
reading of the aphorism (in which we are still thinking about ‘mental exercise’), 
might be evidence that this interpretation of the passage originated with 
Erasistratus, and that the passage’s relevance for medicine had already been 
questioned by Athenaeus’ time. Of course, Galen may just be using Erasistratus 
as an example, but it is tempting to think Galen is entering into an established 
debate about the boundaries between medicine and philosophy. The second 
defence appeals to Epidemics 2.4.4, mentioned earlier, which states rousing the 
emotions can be useful for restoring colour and humours. According to this 
defence, the soul is relevant to medicine because concerns (αἱ φροντίδες), either 
 
72 Note that the parallel given in Wenkebach is almost certainly wrong. Wenkebach gives 
PHP 7.3 (V.602 K. = 440,20-26 De Lacy) as a parallel to this passage. There, Galen mentions 
Erasistratus’ views on the anatomy of the nerves and brain and the only thing he says related to 
the Gal. Hipp. Epid. VI, 6.5.11 passage is that Erasistratus had time to make precise dissections 
‘when he was old and had leisure to focus on the study of the art’ (440,24-25 Wenkebach). What 
Galen must have in mind is Erasistratus’ belief that practice of the rational arts improves their 
performance, which he discusses in Consuet. 1 (17,1-22 Müller = 12,20-14,7 Schmutte). 
73 Gal. Hipp. Epid. VI, 6.5.11 (XVIIB.263-4 K. = 280,20-281,6 Wenkebach): εἰ δέ τῳ δόξει 
φιλοσόφου θεωρίας, οὐκ ἰατρικῆς ὁ λόγος ἔχεσθαι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐνθυμείτω κοινὸν ἁπασῶν εἶναι 
τῶν λογικῶν αὐτὸν τεχνῶν, ἐν αἷς τὸν λογισμὸν χρὴ γυμνάζειν, ὡς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς εἴρηται τῶν 
ἰατρῶν Ἐρασιστράτῳ τ’ οὐκ ὀλιγάκις. ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ πάθη τινὰ γίνεται τὰ μὲν οἷον ναρκοῦντα τὸ 
λογιστικὸν καὶ τὸ μνημονευτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰ δὲ καρώδη καὶ καταφορικά. τούτοις οὖν ἡγητέον 
ὠφελίμους εἶναι τὰς φροντίδας, ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις ἐδίδαξε τὰς ὀξυθυμίας εἶναι χρησίμους εἰς εὐχυμίαν 
τε καὶ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως ἀνάκτησιν. 
74 See n. 72. 
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in the sense of ‘thoughts’ or the more emotional sense of ‘worry’74F75, have a 
therapeutic purpose in cases where some affection has numbed the soul’s 
faculties of reason and memory. 
Neither reason matches what Athenaeus’ answer would be to those who think 
the passage is relevant to philosophy and not medicine. Athenaeus recommended 
thinking to correct mixture of women, which tends to be cold and wet. Athenaeus, 
therefore, would have to say that Hippocrates’ claim about the soul is relevant to 
medicine insofar as the soul’s activities can be used as exercises, in other words 
that the soul’s physiological effects of heating and drying can be regulated 
through regimen. We have no fragments in which Athenaeus makes this claim so 
explicitly; however, it is something Galen says in a passage from De sanitate 
tuenda. And like the discussion of the Epidemics 6 passage, it comes up in 
response to someone who might think it is not for the doctor to deal with matters 
of psychology: 
[…] one should not think that it is only the business of the philosopher to 
shape the character of the soul [ἦθος ψυχῆς]; but rather his because of 
something greater, that is the health of the soul itself, and the doctor’s for 
the sake of the body’s not readily falling victim to sickness. For indeed […] 
an idle intellect, mindlessness and a soul which is completely lacking in 
spirit often bring about poor colour and atrophia through feebleness of the 
innate heat. For above all things our connate heat must be preserved within 
the bounds prescribed by health. And this is preserved by well-balanced 
exercise that takes place not just in the body, but also in the soul.75F76 
Galen does not mention Athenaeus in this passage, but the similarities are 
striking. That the passage from Epidemics 6 appears in Athenaeus’ justification 
for including the soul in regimen hints that Athenaeus may have had a similar 
view in mind. 
 
 
75 Galen is ambiguous here. The reference to Epidemics 2.4.4 suggests the emotional sense, 
but Galen has just said that “acts of thinking [διανοήσεις] are called ‘concerns’ [φροντίδες]” 
(XVIIB.263 K. = 280,16-17 Wenkebach) and takes the aphorism in 6.5.5 to mean, “for human 
kind above all what is to be practiced is reasoning [περὶ παντὸς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀσκητέον ἐστὶ 
τὸν λογισμόν]” (XVIIB.263 K. = 280,15-16 Wenkebach). 
76 Gal. San. Tu. 1.8.15-16 (VI.40-1 K. = 19,26-20,1 Koch), trans. Singer: καὶ μὴ νομίζειν, ὡς 
φιλοσόφῳ μόνῳ προσήκει πλάττειν ἦθος ψυχῆς· ἐκείνῳ μὲν γὰρ δι’ ἕτερόν τι μεῖζον τὴν τῆς 
ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ὑγείαν, ἰατρῷ δὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ῥᾳδίως εἰς νόσους ὑπομεταφέρεσθαι τὸ σῶμα. καὶ γὰρ 
θυμὸς καὶ κλαυθμὸς καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ λύπη καὶ πλεῖον τοῦ δέοντος φροντὶς ἀγρυπνία τε πολλὴ ἐπ’ 
αὐτοῖς γενομένη πυρετοὺς ἀνάπτουσι καὶ νοσημάτων μεγάλων ἀρχαὶ καθίστανται, ὥσπερ καὶ 
τοὐναντίον ἀργὴ διάνοια καὶ ἄνοια καὶ ψυχὴ παντάπασιν ἄθυμος ἀχροίας καὶ ἀτροφίας ἐργάζεται 
πολλάκις ἀρρωστίᾳ τῆς ἐμφύτου θερμότητος. χρὴ μὲν γὰρ φυλάττειν ἅπαντος μᾶλλον ἐν ὅροις 
ὑγιεινοῖς τὴν σύμφυτον ἡμῖν θερμότητα. φυλάττεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν συμμέτρων γυμνασίων οὐ κατὰ 
τὸ σῶμα μόνον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν γινομένων. 
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IV – Emotion, Habituation, Education 
Emotion and Habituation 
Athenaeus is also concerned about the physiological effects of the emotions. 
He thinks the emotions, like thinking, have a direct effect on the body by causing 
the body to be heated or cooled. They are, therefore, just as much a concern for 
the physician as foods or drinks, and part of what he is doing in his writing on 
regimen is explaining when and why they need to be regulated. But regulating 
emotions is not, like regulating food or drink, or even thinking, simply a matter 
of telling a patient whether or not to feel a certain way. For Athenaeus, emotions 
stem from habituation—non-rational, psychological dispositions that determine 
what excites them. Since emotions can affect the body’s health, he thinks 
understanding and regulating the dispositions that lead to them are also a part of 
regimen. 
That emotions have physiological effects is evident in Athenaeus’ 
recommendations for those who are preparing to have children: 
Τοὺς δ’ ἐπὶ παιδοποιΐαν ἰόντας καὶ ψυχῇ καὶ σώματι χρὴ διακεῖσθαι 
κράτιστα· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τῆς μὲν ψυχῆς εὐσταθούσης καὶ μήτε λύπαις μήτε 
μερίμναις σὺν πόνοις μήτε ἄλλῳ πάθει κατεχομένης, τοῦ δὲ σώματος 
ὑγιαίνοντος καὶ κατὰ μηδὲν ἁπλῶς ἐλασσουμένου· ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν εὐσταθῶν 
καὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν οὐχί, ἀλλὰ τῶν νοσερῶν, [ὑγιεῖ καὶ]76F77 νοσερὰ καθ’ ὅλον 
τε τὸν ὄγκον καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ μέρος· διὸ καὶ προδιαιτᾶσθαι 
χρήσιμον, γυμνασίοις μὲν αὐτάρκως καὶ χωρὶς πάσης κακοπαθείας 
κεχρημένους, τροφαῖς δ’ εὐκατεργάστοις καὶ εὐχύμοις καὶ εὐτρόφοις καὶ 
μετρίως ὑγροτέραις καὶ θερμοτέραις, ἀπεχομένους τῶν 
θερμαντικωτέρων. 77F78 
Those entering into the production of children should be in a very strong 
state with respect to soul and body. That is, the soul [must be] tranquil and 
neither in pain, distress, nor seized with some other passion, while the body 
[must be] healthy and in no way generally diminished. It is not from those 
who are tranquil and healthy, but those who are sick that sicknesses arise 
[in offspring], both in the whole body and in each part of it. For this reason, 
 
77 Accepting Raeder’s deletion of ὑγιεῖ καὶ after νοσερῶν. The received text, νοσερῶν ὑγιεῖ 
καὶ νοσερὰ is almost certainly wrong. Raeder’s deletion is arbitrary, but the Hippocratic parallel 
is, I think, good evidence in its favour. It is clear that Daremberg reads the text the same way, but 
I cannot see how his proposed emendation gets him to the interpretation he wants. He prints: τῶν 
ὑγιεινῶν οὐχὶ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν νοσερῶν, ὑγιῆ [sic] καὶ νοσερὰ; but he translates it: “car ce 
ne sont pas seulement les gens tranquilles et bien portants qui engendrent des enfants sains, mais 
les gens maladifs ont aussi des enfants maladifs [for it is not only tranquil and healthy people that 
have healthy children, but sick people also have sick children]” (Daremberg, Oribase, 107). 
  
78 ‘Preparation for Having Children’, Orib. Coll. med. (lib. inc.) 23.1 (115,33-116,6 Raeder). 
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in fact, it is useful to prepare by regimen, making use of exercises that are 
sufficient and separate from any bad passions, and of foods that are easy to 
digest, productive of good humors, nutritious, and moderately wet and hot, 
[while] refraining from those that are too hot. 
One of the things Athenaeus is doing in this passage is explicitly distinguishing 
the health of the body from an analogous state of the soul. He refers to being in 
a very strong state of both soul and body, and then distinguishes between the 
strong body, which he calls healthy (ὑγιαῖνον), and the soul, which he calls calm 
or tranquil (εὐσταθοῦσα). This distinction is important for his claim that tranquil 
and healthy people produce healthy offspring, while sick people produce sick 
offspring. The claim is almost certainly a reference to the Hippocratic Airs 
Waters Places, which states “the seed comes from every part of the body, healthy 
from healthy parts, diseased from diseased parts.”78F79 There is, however, no 
reference to the soul in the passage from Airs Waters Places. Athenaeus is 
incorporating the health of the soul into this Hippocratic claim about the causes 
of congenital illness, claiming that the psychological states of parents are just as 
important to health of the offspring as those of the body.79F80 He does not, however, 
say the parent’s psychological health is important because of its effect on the 
embryo’s own state of mental health or disease.80F81 As with mental exercise, he 
refers the effects of psychological affections to the health or disease of the ὄγκος, 
the corporeal body, of the offspring. 
Because emotions influence the development of offspring, Athenaeus believes 
it is useful to regulate them through regimen (προδιαιτᾶσθαι χρήσιμον). The 
specific emotions he mentions, pain (λύπαις) and distress (μερίμναις σὺν πόνοις), 
are commonly associated with heating and fever.81F82 And just as he thinks one who 
is trying to produce children should regulate their diet by eating foods that 
produce the appropriate amount of heat and moisture, he also thinks they should 
only engage in moderate exercises that are free from all bad emotions (χωρὶς 
 
79 Hippocrates, Aer. 14.5: ὁ γὰρ γόνος πανταχόθεν ἔρχεται τοῦ σώματος, ἀπό τε τῶν ὑγιηρῶν 
ὑγιηρὸς, ἀπό τε τῶν νοσερῶν νοσερός (II.60 L. = 58,20-22 Diller). Athenaeus does not agree that 
the seed comes from the whole body. His views on semen are preserved in Galen, De semine (= 
Gal. Sem.) 2.1.37-50 (IV.602-605 K. = 152,27-156,19 De Lacy). In his commentary Hippocrates’ 
Airs, Water, Places, Galen reports that Athenaeus appealed to other passages, and was interested 
in interpreting references to pneuma as references to innate heat. The text survives in an Arabic 
translation and is currently being edited and translated by Strohmaier for the CMG. I thank him 
for letting me have access to his draft translation. 
80 A similar view is found in Plato, Timaeus 87b4-6. At PHP 5.5.32, Galen attributes the view 
to Posidonius, who Galen claims “admired what Plato said about the shaping of unborn children” 
(V.466 K. = 324,1-2 De Lacy = F148 Edelstein-Kidd, tr. De Lacy). 
81 It is unclear to what extent these states could even apply to a newborn. 
82 See e.g. Hippocrates, De victu 2.61: “By all the thoughts [μεριμνᾷ] that come to a man the 
soul is warmed and dried [θερμαίνεται καὶ ξηραίνεται]” (VI.576 L. = 184,12-3 Joly-Byl, tr. 
Jones). Also, Gal. San. Tu. 1.8.16: “For indeed rage, weeping, anger, distress [λύπη], worry 
[φροντὶς] which is greater than it should be […] set off fevers […] (VI.40 K. = 19,31-33 Koch). 
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πάσης κακοπαθείας). His concern seems to be that too much heat will harm either 
the chances of producing children or the embryo itself, and so must be regulated. 
Other physicians around Athenaeus’ time shared similar beliefs about the 
physiological effects of emotions on childbearing and pregnancy, and 
recommended that doctors should calm down their patients when they become 
agitated for just this reason. Soranus, for instance, recommends that doctors 
should “comfort the soul [παραμυθεῖσθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχήν]” of pregnant women “if 
the concerns of life [βιωτικαὶ φροντίδες] have disordered it.”82F83 But at some point 
such therapeutic intervention would become impractical, and Athenaeus seems 
to be aware of the difficulty involved in having a patient who is in constant need 
of someone else to regulate his or her emotional states. It would be much better 
if patients could moderate their own emotional states and behaviours so that they 
did not have such excessive movements in the first place. 
One way to moderate the emotions would be to have patients avoid situations 
that cause excessive emotional responses. Athenaeus has something like this in 
mind in the case of exercises for those who are preparing to have children. He 
recommends that they avoid exercises that involve excessive bad emotions, 
essentially suggesting that one regulate the external causes of emotions. Another 
way to regulate patients’ emotions would be to regulate the so to speak internal 
causes of emotional responses, the dispositions to emotional responses 
themselves. 
The regulation of internal causes of emotions is accomplished by something 
Athenaeus calls “habituation”: 
συνήθειά ἐστιν ἕξις ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος ἐν χρόνῳ κατεσκευασμένη πρὸς 
ὠφέλειάν τε καὶ βλάβην ὑγιαινόντων τε καὶ νοσούντων· τὸ γὰρ ἔθος ἐν 
χρόνῳ κατασκευάζει τι δι’ ἑαυτοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τοῦτό 
ποτε μὲν ἐπ’ ὠφέλειαν ποιεῖ τινα, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βλάβην.83F84 καὶ οὐ μόνον 
ἐφ’ ὑγιαινόντων ἰσχύει, διατείνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ πρὸς τοὺς νοσοῦντας. τὸ 
δὲ πολυχρόνιον ἔθος οἷον φύσις ἐστὶν ἐπίκτητος· διὸ πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν ἑαυτὸ 
μεταβάλλει, ἐπισφαλὲς καὶ προσαγωγὸν εἰς νόσον.84F85 
Habituation is a state of the soul or body established over time with respect 
to benefit or harm when we are healthy or sick. For habit over time 
establishes something through itself in the soul and the body, and this 
sometimes makes something beneficial, sometimes [something] harmful. 
Not only is it strong in times of health, but it often extends even into times 
of illness. And a habit that lasts for a long time is like an acquired nature. 
For this reason, if any self-mover undergoes a change, it is dangerous and 
 
83 Sor. Gyn. 1.47.3 (34,29-31 Ilberg). 
84 Raeder prints ἐπ’ ὠφέλειαν and ἐπὶ βλάβην, but the text must have been ἐπ᾽ ὠφελείᾳ and 
ἐπὶ βλάβῃ. 
85 ‘On Habituation’, Orib. Coll. med. (lib. inc.) 17.1-3 (106,9-16 Raeder). 
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introduces disease. 
A key part of Athenaeus’ definition of habituation is the notion of stability. 
Habituation is a state one acquires through consistent habit, and which disposes 
us to be benefitted or harmed by the things we encounter. He likens it to an 
acquired nature—something ingrained that determines how we act and respond 
to things. Just as certain things are naturally good or bad for us, so some things 
can be become good or bad for us by habit. One’s body, for instance, may take 
time to get used to certain foods and drinks that at first cause indigestion; but, 
once one is accustomed to them, continuing the diet will not cause any 
physiological problems. An abrupt change in diet, however, like a change 
contrary to nature, will have a deleterious effect on one’s health. 
Athenaeus thinks the same applies in the case of the soul. Things which at first 
rattle the soul because they are unfamiliar will cease to have such an emotional 
effect once one grows accustomed to them.85F86 One’s habitual emotional 
responses, therefore, in time become stable dispositions which determine what 
experiences one will react to emotionally and how strong the emotional response 
will be. 
This understanding of habituation implies that stable psychological 
dispositions have an important role to play in bodily health. If our emotional 
responses are consistent, then the body itself would become accustomed to those 
effects and less likely to be injured by them. Even if the body itself becomes ill, 
so long as we have stable psychological habits, these dispositions are likely to 
persist and so cause no additional harm. 
 
Athenaeus also recognizes that habituation is a neutral term, since one’s habits 
can lead to dispositions that “sometimes makes something beneficial, sometimes 
something harmful.” Habituation in this sense suggests Athenaeus recognized 
another aspect of habituation—our dispositions to certain behaviours or desires. 
Habitual desires took on an important role in several discussion of the aetiology 
of new diseases in the early Imperial period. These diseases included some 
named conditions, like elephantiasis86F87 and hydrophobia.87F88 More often, however, 
they were referred to in common as ‘diseases of regimen.’88F89 
 
86 Athenaeus makes use of habituation in this sense in ‘On Healthy Regimen’, discussed 
below. Strabo attributes an anecdote about emotional habituation to Posidonius: “Posidonius says 
he often observed [barbarians decapitating people], and at first he was disgusted [τὸ μὲν πρῶτον 
ἀηδίζεσθαι], but after a while took it lightly due to habituation [μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα φέρειν πρᾷως διὰ 
τὴν συνήθειαν]” (Strabo, Geo. 4.4.5 = F274 Edelstein-Kidd). Cf. also Gal. PHP 4.7.7-8 (V.417-
18 K. = 282,5-14 De Lacy = F165 Edelstein-Kidd); and Plutarch, De tuenda sanitate praecepta 
(= Plut. Tu. San.) 3, Moralia 123c10-15. 
87 Plut. Quaest. conv. 8.9 (Moralia 730f4-5). 
88 Plut. Quaest. conv. 8.9 (Moralia 731b2-3). 
89 Plut. Quaest. conv. 8.9 (Moralia 734c1-5): “Change in regimen is able to generate new 
diseases or do away with others [ἡ περὶ τὴν δίαιταν μεταβολὴ τὰ μὲν νῦν γεννᾶν τὰ δ’ ἀφανίζειν 
τῶν νοσημάτων οὐκ ἀδύνατός ἐστιν]”. 
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The appearance of new diseases posed a serious problem for those who, like 
the Stoics and Platonists, maintained a belief in a stable natural order, and the 
way out of the problem was to attribute responsibility for these diseases not to 
nature, but to choices in regimen. But these discussions were often moralizing, 
identifying the moral disposition or virtue of temperance as co-extensive with 
health, and vices like intemperance, laziness and luxuriousness with disease. 
Seneca, who likely lived not long after Athenaeus, complained that Rome was 
plagued by new diseases brought about by all kinds of luxuriousness and 
pleasure-seeking;89F90 and Plutarch, a generation later, concluded that while the 
effects of nature are constant, humans can nevertheless acquire dispositions to 
behave in certain ways with respect to food, exercise and baths that will bring 
about disease.90F91 In these discussions, ethics becomes a concern for medicine 
because of a belief that one’s psychological habituation in the moral sense—
one’s disposition to morally good and bad behaviours—somehow tracks the state 
of ones physiological health. The medical discipline of regimen, then, had come 
to share certain norms about appropriate behaviours and desires with ethics. 
There is no evidence that Athenaeus discussed habitual desires in reference to 
new diseases, but he does sometimes write as if he shares a belief that disease-
promoting and vice-promoting behaviours are co-extensive. As we have seen, in 
‘On Regimen for Women,’ he writes that “women who live softly and 
luxuriously [ὑγρῶς καὶ τρυφερῶς βιοῦσαι]” differ from those who do the work 
themselves [τὰς αὐτουργούς] “with respect to health, pregnancy, and ease of 
labour” because of their lifestyle. In ‘On Healthy Regimen’ he calls excessive 
sexual pleasures “acts of intemperance” [τὰς ἀκολασίας], which cause “the 
slackening of soul and body.”91F92 
One way to avoid such diseases, one might think, is to develop self-control so 
that one does not give in to one’s desires in the first place. And Athenaeus does 
say that one should “try to restrain one’s impulses [πειρᾶσθαι δὲ τὰς ὁρμὰς 
καταστέλλειν]” when they could cause harm.92F93 But self-control is not practical 
in every situation. He says some desires are stronger [ἰσχυρότερα] than our ability 
to control them, and in these cases he recommends diversion, so that one may 
“be prevented from [being driven] by these impulses” by exhausting oneself 
through mental and physical exercise.93F94 Nor is self-control always the healthiest 
option, especially if our unfulfilled desires cause enough emotional distress to 
lead to bodily harm. Soranus, for instance, suggests that sometimes it is better if 
doctors give patients what they want, even though what they desire is harmful, 
 
90 Seneca, Epistulae 95.18: “Quid alios referam innumerabiles morbos, supplicia luxuriae?” 
91 Plut. Quaest. conv. 8.9 (Moralia 732d11-e6): πλησμονὰς δὲ καὶ θρύψεις καὶ ἡδυπαθείας 
ἐπελθεῖν μετ’ ἀργίας καὶ σχολῆς δι’ ἀφθονίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων. 
92 ‘On Healthy Regimen’, Orib. Coll. med. (lib. inc.) 39.8 (139,35-36 Raeder): οὐδὲν γὰρ 
οὕτως ἐγκοπτικὸν εἰς ἐπίδοσιν ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ὡς ἡ πρόωρος καὶ δαψιλὴς χρῆσις τῶν 
ἀφροδισίων. συναιρετέον δὲ καὶ τὸν οἶνον ἐπὶ τούτων, παρορμῶντα πρὸς τὰς ἀκολασίας. 
93 ‘On Healthy Regimen’, Orib. Coll. med. (lib. inc.) 39.12 (140,6-7 Raeder). 
94 ‘On Healthy Regimen’, Orib. Coll. med. (lib. inc.) 39.12-13 (140,8-12 Raeder). 
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[ταῖς δὲ πρὸς τὰ βλαβερὰ … ἐπιθυμίαις], because the effect on the body of not 
giving into the desire is worse. 94F95 While Athenaeus does not mention such a case, 
it is something he is committed to. If one becomes accustomed to desiring certain 
things and then cannot obtain them, whether the constraint is self-imposed or 
external, one would be unaccustomed to the emotional response produced by the 
constrained desire—a change which is, for Athenaeus, “dangerous and disease-
promoting [ἐπισφαλὲς καὶ προσαγωγὸν εἰς νόσον].” 
Here morality and medicine may come apart for Athenaeus. While he thinks 
some dispositions to disease-promoting behaviour are coextensive with moral 
categories, he nevertheless seems to privilege bodily health over moral health. 
He is, at least, committed to the same view as Soranus, that in cases where self-
control might lead to disease, one should act in a way to avoid it, regardless of 
the moral consequences. Nevertheless, Athenaeus thinks that the best approach 
to avoiding diseases of regimen is to habituate one’s emotions and desires to what 
is beneficial, and to maintain those habits as consistently as possible.95F96 
Education 
Athenaeus’ hygienic advice, however, extends beyond habituation of non-
rational drives and desires. He is also concerned about intellectual exercise—the 
kind of advice he gives to women when he said they should study the theory of 
how to manage a household. This is also the advice he gives in a fragment on 
healthy regimen, in which he discusses how body and soul should be regulated 
from weaning to old age. In this fragment, he gives advice about when a child 
should go to a schoolteacher, what kind of school-teacher it should have, what 
subjects it should learn, and what kind of habits it should be raised in. In its 
paedagogical comprehensiveness, it is unparalleled in any earlier extant medical 
writers. It also seems to have been heavily criticized by his contemporaries. But 
these criticisms are helpful for understanding why Athenaeus believed medicine 
should take such an active role in the cognitive and intellectual development of 
those in its care. 
The passage, from a fragment with the title ‘On Healthy Regimen,’ is long, 
but it is worth quoting in full: 
Allow infants who have just been weaned from milk to live in relaxation 
and amusement [ἐν ἀνέσει τε ἐᾶν καὶ παιδιᾷ]. Accustom them to an easiness 
of the soul [τῇ ψυχικῇ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ κατεθίζειν] and to exercises accompanied 
 
95 Sor. Gyn. 1.53.2 (38,29-30 Ilberg): “for [when those who desire something] do not get what 
they want, the body in fact grows thinner [μὴ τυγχάνουσαι <γὰρ> ὧν θέλουσιν τῇ δυσθυμίᾳ τῆς 
ψυχῆς ἀπισχνοῦσιν καὶ τὸ σῶμα]”. 
96 Cf. Plutarch, De tranquillitate animi (Moralia 476a1-4): “the disposition of the wise man 
furnishes extreme calm to his bodily affections [τοῖς τε σωματικοῖς παρέχει γαλήνην], destroying 
by means of self-control, temperate diet, and moderate exertion [ἐγκρατείᾳ καὶ διαίτῃ σώφρονι 
καὶ μετρίοις πόνοις] the conditions leading to disease”. 
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with games and cheerfulness. […] From six and seven years, give boys and 
girls over to gentle and benevolent elementary teachers. For those who are 
able to draw young children in [προσαγόμενοι τὰ παιδία] and teach using 
persuasion and consolation, and who frequently offer praise as well, are 
successful, and encourage them more and teach them with joy and 
relaxation. Relaxation and joy of the soul contribute greatly to a well-
nurtured body [ἡ δ’ ἄνεσις καὶ χαρὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς εὐτροφίαν σώματος 
μεγάλα συμβάλλεται]. But those in charge of teaching who are also 
relentless with their punishments make them servile, fearful and hostile to 
education [πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις]. For thrashing them, they oblige them to 
learn and to recall at the same time they are [receiving] the blows, when, in 
fact, they have become unable to think properly. Nor is it necessary to 
oppress the new students for the whole day, but give over a greater portion 
to their amusement. For, in fact, we see among the stronger [children] and 
those more mature for their age, that those who carefully and ceaselessly 
attend to their lessons are thoroughly corrupted in their bodies 
[καταφθειρομένους τοῖς σώμασιν]. Twelve-year-old children are to go at 
this time to elementary and geometry teachers and to exercise the body 
[πρός τε γραμματικοὺς φοιτᾶν ἤδη καὶ γεωμέτρας καὶ τὸ σῶμα γυμνάζειν]. 
It is necessary that their tutors [παιδαγωγοὺς] and supervisors [ἐπιστάτας] 
be sound-minded, and not completely inexperienced, so that they observe 
the proper times and appropriate amounts of food, exercise, baths, sleep and 
other matters that have to do with regimen. [I say this] because most men 
hire grooms [for their horses] for a good amount of money, choosing ones 
who are careful and experienced, but the tutor [παιδαγωγοὺς] they appoint 
for their children is inexperienced and actually useless, and not in fact able 
to help in matters of life. From fourteen years until twenty-one, more 
serious training [μαθημάτων ἄσκησις] and practice in mathematics is 
appropriate, as is instruction and note-taking on the discussions of the 
philosophers, and of the notes taken, a more earnest rendering. It is useful, 
or rather necessary, for all men from this age, at the same time as these 
other subjects, to call on the art of medicine as well, and to listen to its 
theory, so that they themselves should often have reputable and good 
counsel about what is useful for well-being [τῶν εἰς σωτηρίαν χρησίμων]. 
For there is just about no period of time, either at night or during the day, 
in which we have no need of this art, but even in walking and sitting, 
anointing and bathing, eating and drinking, sleeping and waking – in all 
activities throughout the whole length of life and in each way of life, we 
have need of its counsel for the prevention of harm and it’s advantageous 
use. Also, to call on a doctor always and in all cases is wearisome and 
impossible. Thus, in matters concerning the soul [τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ ψυχὴν] 
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for those of this age, this is the way to regulate them. 96F97 
This advice sometimes draws on his views concerning the physiological effects 
of habituation. The majority of it, however, concerns education: the type of 
education children should receive, when they should receive it, and from whom. 
Both kinds of advice seem to have been attacked by Athenaeus’ contemporaries 
because they sound literally schoolmasterly (ὡς παιδαγωγικά): it is the advice of 
a school-teacher, not a doctor, and it confuses the boundaries between philosophy 
and medicine. 
The first criticism is found in Plutarch’s Advice on healthy regimen (De tuenda 
sanitate praecepta). Plutarch tells a story about a doctor named Glaucus who 
reprimanded some philosophers for discussing the topic of healthy regimen (περὶ 
διαίτης ὑγιεινῆς). Glaucus singled out two of the philosopher’s claims as 
ridiculous, one about the habituation of the body, the other the habituation of the 
soul. According to Glaucus, the philosophers claimed that in order to be healthy 
one must keep their limbs moving, since otherwise the lack of movement would 
set up a kind of habituation or condition of fever (τινὰ συνήθειαν ἢ μελέτην 
ἐμποιεῖ πυρετοῦ) due to the concentration of warmth in the limbs. The 
philosophers also claimed that people should, when already healthy, eat the kind 
of food they will need to eat when they are sick, since this way they will 
“habituate their desire at once to be obedient to what is beneficial with 
satisfaction [τήν ὄρεξιν ἅμα τοῦ συμφέροντος ὑπήκοον ἐθίζοντας εἶναι μετ’ 
εὐκολίας].” Glaucus rejects both claims concerning habituation for the same 
reason: not because their advice is necessarily bad, but, he says, because the 
advice they are giving is like something you get from a school-teacher (ὡς 
παιδαγωγικά) and ‘confuses the boundaries’ (σύγχυσιν ὅρων) of medicine and 
philosophy.97F98 Plutarch is trying to emphasize the all-encompassing nature of 
philosophy using Glaucus as a foil. For Plutarch, the philosophers should not be 
blamed for discussing matters of health: “rather they should be blamed if they do 
not consider it their duty to abolish the boundaries altogether and to make a single 
field, as it were, of all honourable studies.”98F99 And he portrays Glaucus as a doctor 
whose complaint is that these philosophers merely play at being doctor, 
discussing a subject they are not qualified to discuss. Yet, even though he uses 
him as a foil, Plutarch is not implying Glaucus is a bad doctor. As doctor he 
praises him.99F100 Instead, Plutarch is using him as medicine’s plausible 
representative, and he needs him in this role if his views about the relationship 
 
97 ‘On Healthy Regimen’, Orib. Coll. med. (lib. inc.) 39.1-8 (138,19-139,30 Raeder). 
98 Plut. Tu. San. 1 (Mor. 122b-e). “Paedagogical” may also be a reference to Plato, Respublica 
3, 406A5-6, which refers to regimen as “that modern medicine which waits on disease like a child 
[τῇ παιδαγωγικῇ τῶν νοσημάτων ταύτῃ τῇ νῦν ἰατρικῇ]”. 
  
99 Plut. Tu. San. 1 (Mor. 122e): ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνελόντες οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς ὅρους 
ὥσπερ ἐν μιᾷ χώρᾳ κοινῶς ἐμφιλοκαλεῖν, ἅμα τὸ ἡδὺ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον διώκοντες. 
100 Plut. Tu. San. 1 (Mor. 122c). 
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between medicine and philosophy are to stand in contrast to Plutarch’s own. 
Glaucus’ criticism of the philosophers could equally apply to Athenaeus’ 
advice concerning habituation, since Athenaeus suggests that recommending 
certain psychological habits is part of what physicians ought to do. It seems, 
therefore, that Athenaeus’ views regarding the relationship between philosophy 
and medicine, or at least these kinds of views, were up for debate not only 
between doctors and philosophers, but among doctors themselves. 
 
Evidence for this debate among doctors emerges from a similar criticism 
regarding habituation and education in Soranus’ Gynaecology. It comes at the 
end of his discourse on paediatrics (τὸν περὶ παιδοτροφίας λόγον), a discussion 
which covers a range of topics from cutting the umbilical cord to weaning the 
infant. He ends his discussion by criticizing those doctors who go beyond what 
is traditionally paediatrics and branch into what he calls philosophy: 
τὸ δὲ πόσων ἐτῶν αὐτὸ γενόμενον παιδαγωγῷ παραδοτέον καὶ ποταπῷ 
τούτῳ καὶ ἣν συνήθειαν αὐτῷ κατασκευαστέον πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς, ὅτε μὴ 
τρέφεται παρ’ αὐτοῖς, καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐμφερῶς ζητούμενον τούτοις οὐ κατ’ 
ἰατρικάς ἐστιν ὑποθήκας, φιλοσοφωτέραν δὲ τὴν διάταξιν ἔσχηκεν, ὥστε 
παρὰ τρόπον ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες φιλοσοφεῖν αὐτοῖς τὸν περὶ 
παιδοτροφίας λόγον ἐνθάδε τελειοῦμεν.100F101 
At what age the child should be handed over to a tutor [παιδαγωγῷ 
παραδοτέον], what kind of person [the tutor] should be, in what manner [ἣν 
συνήθειαν] the child should be prepared by him for the parents if not 
brought up by them, and any inquiry similar to these are not instructions in 
accordance with medicine [οὐ κατ’ ἰατρικάς ὑποθήκας]. They rather belong 
to a more philosophical arrangement of topics [φιλοσοφωτέραν τὴν 
διάταξιν]. So, we leave it to others to break with custom and philosophize 
[παρὰ τρόπον ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες φιλοσοφεῖν], while we ourselves here 
bring to end the discourse on paediatrics [τὸν περὶ παιδοτροφίας λόγον]. 
The arrangement of topics (τὴν διάταξιν) Soranus mentions are identical to those 
discussed by Athenaeus in the fragment “On Healthy Regimen.”101F102 He believes, 
however, that the topics treated in this arrangement—education and 
habituation—are philosophical, not medical, topics. Like Glaucus, Soranus 
 
101 Sor. Gyn. 2.57.2-3 (93,9-14 Ilberg), trans. Temkin, modified slightly. 
102 There is a strong case to be made that he has Athenaeus in mind. First, Athenaeus follows 
the same fixed order of topics Soranus mentions. Second, Soranus emphasizes that he is finishing 
his “discourse on pediatrics” (τὸν περὶ παιδοτροφίας λόγον) before the point at which other 
writers on pediatrics do. Not only, therefore, is Soranus stating the existence of abnormally 
philosophical writings on pediatrics, he would also recognize Athenaeus’ hygienic advice as such. 
Finally, he does not seem to be referring to philosophers or some other group who wrote works 
on pediatrics. Whatever group he is calling ‘others’, it is hard to imagine those who “break with 
custom and philosophize” could refer to anyone other than doctors. 
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thinks that for a doctor to engage in the cultivation of intellectual and moral 
virtues would be to confuse the boundaries between medicine and philosophy, of 
paediatrics (παιδοτροφία) and education (παιδεία). Traditionally this was true. 
The arrangement of topics Soranus refers to as a “more philosophical” was 
codified by Athenaeus’ teacher, the philosopher Posidonius, in the first book of 
his work On Affections (περὶ παθῶν). Galen reports he “wrote a kind of epitome 
of Plato’s remarks about children, how they must be brought up and educated 
[τρέφεσθαι καὶ παιδεύεσθαι] in order that the affective and irrational part of their 
soul may exhibit due measure in its motions and obedience to the commands of 
reason.”102F103 Soranus is right in pointing out that education and habituation are 
traditionally philosophical topics. 
The disagreement, however, is deeper than disciplinary boundaries. It arises 
from a fundamental difference in their approach to paediatrics and their 
understanding of its aims. For Soranus, paediatrics ends when a child is weaned 
and begins teething—the time at which it no longer depends on its mother or wet-
nurses for nourishment and must learn to care for itself. The aim of paediatrics is 
to get the child to this point of development in a state of health. For Athenaeus, 
this is not the end of paediatrics, but a point at which a child is most vulnerable. 
As children become more self-reliant, they begin to develop habits, which over 
time establish dispositions in the soul. Athenaeus says dispositions are only like 
an acquired nature, but there is an importance difference between a person’s 
dispositional and natural ‘drives’: unlike natural drives or responses, habitual 
ones have no inherent aims. Whether they are helpful or harmful is determined 
by the kinds of activities one habitually engages in. This is why Athenaeus places 
such importance on the kind of paedagogue one appoints to children, and why he 
is so critical of those who appoint a paedagogue who is “inexperienced and 
actually useless.” The paedagogue must be someone who knows “the proper 
times and appropriate amounts of food, exercise, baths, sleep and other matters 
that have to do with regimen” so that the child will become habituated to pursuing 
these as if they were natural. It is also why he places such importance on 
children’s emotional habituation. A calm emotional disposition makes children 
less liable to excessive heating and drying, the harmful physiological correlates 
which accompany emotional distress and so cause harm to the body. 
The aim, therefore, of Athenaeus’ paediatric advice is to ensure that as an adult 
one has the emotional and cognitive abilities required to care for one’s own 
health. This means caring for a child’s physiological development; but it also 
means caring for a child’s soul by ensuring the child is habituated to the right 
kinds of desires and emotional dispositions, and by educating the child in such a 
way that it can, when grown, distinguish “what is useful for well-being [τῶν εἰς 
 
103 Gal. PHP 5.5.32 (V.466 K. = 324,6-10 De Lacy = F148 Edelstein-Kidd). Galen goes on to 
report that Posidonius believed a child’s rational capacity becomes strong enough to rule the body 
at fourteen years, the age at which Athenaeus believes a youth should seriously begin their studies 
and begin to learn medicine. 
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σωτηρίαν χρησίμων]” from what is not. 
 
V – Conclusion 
I have tried to show that the disputes among medical writers in the early Imperial 
period can give us insight into the types of problems that arose from the 
integration of philosophical psychology and traditional Hippocratic medicine. 
These disputes focus not only on the relationship between psychological and 
bodily health, but on the kinds of reasons medical writers gave for and against 
expanding the boundaries of medicine to include traditionally philosophical 
topics like emotional habituation, education and intellectual study. For 
Athenaeus, these philosophical topics are equally important for medicine, since 
ultimately the way one thinks and feels has a profound effect on the health of the 
body. Like Plato in the Timaeus, Athenaeus claimed that well-being (σωτηρία) 
consists of a regimen that includes the training of both body and soul. Yet, he 
bases this claim on the authority of Hippocrates.103F104 This dialectical strategy, 
perhaps more than any of his individual doctrines, was to be Athenaeus’ lasting 




104 On Galen’s use of Plato and relevant literature, see the introduction to Singer, P.N. (2014). 
Galen: Psychological Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 18-21. 
105 I would like to thank participants of the conference, ‘Mental Diseases in Ancient 
Medicine’, for discussion on an earlier draft of this paper, especially Marke Ahonen, Christopher 
Gill, Chrisitian Laes, and Heinrich von Staden. Thanks to members of the Alexander von 
Humboldt Professur at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, ‘Medicine of the Mind, Philosophy of 
the Body’, especially Philip van der Eijk, Julien Devinant, Matyáš Havrda, Stavros 
Kouloumentas, and Christine Salazar; an audience at the University of Western Ontario, 
especially Devin Henry, Riin Sirkel, and Georgia Mouroutsou; my colleagues Ricardo Julião and 
Orly Lewis at Excellence-Cluster Topoi Area D-2; and to the editors, Chiara Thumiger and Peter 
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